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ABSTRACT 
NATO and the United States are actively pursuing missile defense policies.  
NATO has invested in the Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) 
information network to support the Theater Missile Defense (TMD) capabilities of 
specific Allies for the protection of forward deployed troops, and studies of the feasibility 
and political-military implications of Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) for the protection 
of NATO territory, forces and population centers.  The U.S. program includes TMD 
activities in cooperation with NATO Allies, such as Patriot, as well as BMD research and 
deployment.  The U.S. proposal to deploy BMD system elements in Poland and the 
Czech Republic has led to more extensive discussions of BMD in the Alliance.  The 
North Atlantic Council made BMD-relevant decisions in April 2008.   
The United States and its NATO Allies nonetheless seem to differ greatly on the 
urgency and importance of pursuing BMD.  TMD generates far more cooperation and 
support within the Alliance than does BMD for the protection of NATO territory, forces 
and population centers. This thesis compares TMD and BMD policies within the Alliance 
in an attempt to identify the causes of disagreements on BMD policy and to propose a 
course of action that may meet the Alliance’s goals. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
 NATO and the United States are actively pursuing relatively ambitious and 
independent Missile Defense (MD) policies.  NATO has engaged in two key activities 
related to MD: Theater Missile Defense (TMD) of forward deployed troops and studies 
of the feasibility and political-military implications of Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) 
for the protection of NATO territory, forces and population centers.1   
 The U.S. MD program, which is operating independently of NATO coordination, 
is focused on the same two objectives as the NATO activities.  The U.S. TMD program is 
focused on refining existing systems and developing improved lower and upper tier TMD 
systems.  The United States currently has a Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) for 
the protection of its territory, forces, and population centers deployed in California and 
Alaska.  The United States is also in the advanced stages of talks with Poland and the 
Czech Republic regarding the possible installation of BMDS elements to provide 
protection for North America and most of NATO Europe from Middle Eastern threats.2    
 NATO and the United States seem to be pursuing independent paths of TMD and 
BMD development and differ greatly on the urgency and the importance of pursuing 
BMD.  Both NATO and the United States strongly support TMD development and 
deployment activities.  TMD of forward deployed troops generates far more cooperation 
and support within the Alliance than does BMD for the protection of NATO territory, 
forces and population centers.  Why do the U.S. and NATO efforts, which have similar 
goals, seem to be taking distinct or even divergent paths with respect to BMD, and what 
are the possible causes of this dichotomy?  This thesis compares TMD and BMD policies 
within the Alliance in order to clarify the primary causes of policy divergence and 
prescribe a future course of action that may better satisfy the Alliance’s goals. 
 
1 “Topics: Missile Defence,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 
http://www.nato.int/issues/missile_defence/index.html.  
2 “U.S. and Poland Agree in Principle on Missile Defense,” New York Times, February 2, 2008, A2.  
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 TMD is, to be sure, a form of BMD.  TMD concentrates on protecting forward 
deployed forces from short and medium-range missiles (that is, missiles with a range up 
to 2,500 km).  TMD systems can only provide “point” defense to a specific area or group 
of deployed forces.  Additionally, TMD systems are not capable of engaging longer 
range, strategic Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs).  Therefore, TMD systems 
have typically been viewed as conventional defensive weapons that do not impact a 
nation’s strategic force and as such were not regulated by the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile 
(ABM) Treaty.   
In contemporary usage, employed in this thesis, “BMD” signifies protection of 
territory and population centers against attacks with longer-range missiles (4,500 km and 
above).  As opposed to the “point” defense provided by TMD systems, BMD systems are 
specifically designed to provide “area” protection to large portions of territory from 
attack by longer range ballistic missiles.  This area protection has the potential to nullify 
an adversaries strategic missile forces and as a result, BMD systems were restricted by 
the 1972 ABM Treaty.  Shorter-range missiles could also be employed to attack cities 
and territories, but in this case TMD systems might offer the most suitable defense. 
B. IMPORTANCE  
 BMD is an important political topic within the Alliance that has been primarily 
driven by the United States.  Since the end of the Cold War in 1989-1991 the NATO 
Allies have devoted greater attention than during the Cold War period to the pursuit by 
regional powers of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction.  The National 
Defense Authorization Act for 1996 identified four key areas of concern for the future of 
U.S. BMD strategy.  The four areas of concern were the development of a National 
Missile Defense System, development of TMD systems, negotiations with Russia, and 
possible amendment or withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in order 
to achieve these goals.3  Section 238 of the National Defense Authorization Act urged the 
President:  
 
3 104th Congress, House Resolution 1530, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, 
Title II, Subtitle C – Ballistic Missile Defense Act of 1995. 
http://www.thomas.gov/cgibin/query/F?c104:3:./temp/~c104ITyFnS:e139706 . 
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(1) to pursue high-level discussions with allies of the United States and 
selected other states on the means and methods by which the parties on a 
bilateral basis can cooperate in the development, deployment, and 
operation of ballistic missile defenses; 
(2) to take the initiative within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to 
develop consensus in the Alliance for a timely deployment of effective 
ballistic missile defenses by the Alliance; and 
(3) in the interim, to seek agreement with allies of the United States and 
selected other states on steps the parties should take, consistent with their 
national interests, to reduce the risks posed by the threat of limited 
ballistic missile attacks, such steps to include— 
(A) the sharing of early warning information derived from sensors 
deployed by the United States and other states; 
(B) the exchange on a reciprocal basis of technical data and 
technology to support both joint development programs and the 
sale and purchase of missile defense systems and components; and 
(C) operational level planning to exploit current missile defense 
capabilities and to help define future requirements.4 
 
NATO’s 1991 Strategic Concept identified the potential threat posed by ballistic 
missiles and recommended that “complementary approaches, including for example, 
export control and missile defences,” be pursued to solve the problem.5  The 1999 
Strategic Concept identified BMD as a means of protection from nuclear, biological, and 
chemical (NBC) weapons and their means of delivery.6  The Missile Defence Feasibility 
Study (MD-FS), which was initiated at the 2002 Prague Summit, concluded, as the Allies 
noted at the 2006 Riga Summit, that ”missile defence is technically feasible within the 
limitations and assumptions of the study.”7  At the April 2008 Bucharest Summit the 
Allies declared that:  
Ballistic missile proliferation poses an increasing threat to Allies’ forces, 
territory and populations.  Missile defence forms part of a broader 
response to counter this threat.  We therefore recognise the substantial 
                                                 
4104th Congress, House Resolution 1530, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, 
Section 238, Paragraphs 1-3.  
5 “The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization (November 7, 1991): 
Paragraph 49.  http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c911107a.htm.  
6 “The Alliance’s Strategic Concept,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization (April 24, 1999): Paragraph 
56.  http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm. 
7 “Riga Summit Declaration,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization (November 29, 2006): Paragraph 
25.  http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-150e.htm.   
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contribution to the protection of Allies from long-range ballistic missiles 
to be provided by the planned deployment of European-based United 
States missile defence assets.  We are exploring ways to link this 
capability with current NATO missile defence efforts as a way to ensure 
that it would be an integral part of any future NATO-wide missile defence 
architecture.  Bearing in mind the principle of the indivisibility of Allied 
security as well as NATO solidarity, we task the Council in Permanent 
Session to develop options for a comprehensive missile defence 
architecture to extend coverage to all Allied territory and populations not 
otherwise covered by the United States system for review at our 2009 
Summit, to inform any future political decision.8 
This statement is noteworthy because it refers to a central topic of this thesis: 
reconciling NATO and U.S. BMD efforts. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
TMD of forward deployed troops is the type of missile defense associated with 
the least amount of discord within the Alliance.  However, this does not mean that the 
United States and NATO are on convergent paths of development.  The current state of 
TMD efforts presents three issues that may provide insight into the sources of friction 
over the larger issue of BMD for the protection of NATO territory, forces, and population 
centers.  First, TMD efforts within the Alliance have been based upon a widely agreed 
upon threat assessment.  The greatest missile threat to forward deployed troops consists 
of Theater Ballistic Missiles (TBM) with a range of less than 2,500 km.  As a result of 
this threat assessment, most TMD systems are lower tier (MEADS, Patriot, SAMP-T) or 
upper tier (AEGIS, THAAD) and capable of protecting only a limited amount of territory 
from slower, shorter range TBMs.9    
 
8 “Bucharest Summit Declaration.”  
9 Lower or upper tier refers to the altitude at which a TMD system is capable of engaging a TBM.  
Lower tier systems typically cannot conduct engagements above 35km.  This limits their capabilities to 
shorter-range TBMs because the TBM’s depressed trajectory keeps the flight path and intercept at a lower 
altitude.  An upper tier system is capable of conducting engagements from 35km to over 100 km.  This 
makes upper tier systems more effective against longer-range TBMs because the missile’s lofted trajectory 
allows more time for engagement at higher altitudes.  BMD systems (as defined in this thesis) are capable 
only of exoatmospheric engagements above 100km. 
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 Second, TMD decision-making within the alliance has revolved around 
capabilities rather than politics.  What has developed is a process in which Canada and 
the European members of the Alliance have allowed the United States to bear most of the 
research and development costs, while they have borne limited purchasing costs.  With 
the exception of the SAMP-T, a French-Italian endeavor, every TMD system fielded 
within the Alliance was developed almost exclusively by the United States.  The United 
States has had little input from most of the other members of the Alliance in its design 
and development of TMD systems and has borne willingly most of the costs.  TMD 
solutions have been identified purely on operational and technological grounds, devoid of 
politics.   
 Finally, the development and deployment of TMD systems were never restricted 
under the 1972 ABM Treaty, which was in force until June 2002.  TMD systems have 
always been much less politically contentious than BMD systems as they are only for the 
protection of forward deployed troops and lack the capability to defend against ICBMs 
and Sea-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs).   
BMD for the protection of NATO territory, forces and population centers is an 
area in which the United States and NATO appear to be taking divergent paths.  Most 
European governments express varying levels of support for the proposed U.S. BMD 
system.  While some governments express concerns about the proposed U.S. BMD 
system, most acknowledge its potential benefits.  Confirming this view is Paragraph 37 of 
the Bucharest Summit Declaration, where the Allies agreed to “recognise the substantial 
contribution to the protection of Allies from long-range ballistic missiles to be provided 
by the planned deployment of European-based United States missile defence assets.”10   
 Expressing the greatest concern within the Alliance over the proposed U.S. BMD 
system are Germany and France.  “German perspectives on…BMD are shaped 
significantly by geopolitics and geoeconomics.”11  Berlin is sensitive to Moscow’s 
reaction to the proposed U.S. BMD system because of its proximity to Russia and their 
growing economic interdependence.  Because of their proximity, Germans and Russians 
 
10 “Bucharest Summit Declaration.”  
11 Colin S. Gray, “European Perspective on U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense,” Comparative Strategy 21 
(2002): 289.  
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are accustomed to being sensitive to one and others security concerns.  Additionally, 
German investments in Russia have risen steadily since the end of the Cold War.  
Moreover, Germany receives a large amount of its energy supplies from Russia and 
Berlin does not wish to see any of these relationships destabilized by its support for the 
proposed U.S. BMD system. 
Along with Germany, France expresses a high level of concern over the proposed 
U.S. BMD system.  The objection from Paris is not against a BMD system, but an 
American led BMD project.  Paris is in favor of developing some sort of protection from 
ICBMs, but believes it should be primarily a European project.  The 2008 French White 
Paper on Defence and National Security calls for France to retain its role in defense 
development:  
France must retain its areas of [technical] sovereignty, concentrated on the 
capability necessary for the maintenance of the strategic and political 
autonomy of the nation: nuclear deterrence; ballistic missiles; SSNs; and 
cyber-security are amongst the priorities. As regards the other 
technologies and capacities that it may wish to acquire, France believes 
that the European framework must be privileged.12 
 European governments generally support the proposed U.S. BMD system with the 
primary opposition coming in the form of public opinion.  Prague and Warsaw have 
already agreed to host portions of the proposed U.S. BMD system.  Polish government 
support for the proposed U.S. BMD system is strong as Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s 
Civic Platform party controls a majority of Senate seats and a near majority in the Sejm.  
While government support for the proposed U.S. BMD system is strong, public support is 
much lower.  According to Polish Defense Minister Bogdan Klich, "About 15 percent of 
Poles would support the American installation of the shield in Poland, without any other 
contributions…But 50 percent would support such an installation if it contributed to the 
modernization of our armed forces."13   
 
12 2008 French White Paper on Defence and National Security, Section 2, Paragraph 13.  
http://www.ambafrance-ca.org/IMG/pdf/Livre_blanc_Press_kit_english_version.pdf.   
13 Bogdan Klich quoted by Judy Dempsey, “Poland Wants U.S. to be Third Leg of its Security Plan,” 
International Herald Tribune (April 21, 2008). http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/04/21/europe/poland.php.  
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Support in the Czech Republic is much weaker because of the fragile coalition 
government assembled by Prime Minister Mirek Topolánek.  While the Topolánek 
coalition supports the proposed U.S. BMD system now, low public support may force 
dissention with in the coalition.  In the Czech Republic, public opinion polls indicate that 
only about 35% of Czechs support basing elements of the proposed U.S. BMD system on 
Czech soil. 14   
Some observers have attributed the divergence in BMD support to different threat 
assessments. This thesis investigates the hypothesis that one of the causes of 
disagreement over BMD policy between the United States and NATO resides in differing 
threat assessments. The primary difference in threat assessment has been attributed to the 
emphasis on capabilities or intent as American threat assessments are heavily based on a 
state’s capabilities while European threat assessments are heavily based on a state’s 
intentions.15  Threat assessment is an important factor in decision making about BMD 
because threat is the primary justification for any MD system.   
 U.S. - European divergences in BMD policy have also been attributed to technical 
uncertainties regarding the system.  In a situation similar to that with TMD development, 
the United States is trying to develop and deploy an independently developed BMD 
system.  There are much greater technical and political problems associated with a BMD 
system than with a TMD system.  The proposed BMD system leaves portions of 
southeastern Europe unprotected.  The Allies therefore agreed at the Bucharest Summit, 
as noted above, to review options to ensure the indivisibility of Alliance security.16  This 
thesis investigates the hypothesis that technical uncertainties regarding the performance 
of U.S. BMD systems may constitute a factor explaining U.S.-NATO differences in 




14 Andrew Thompson, “Czech Republic: Issues Under the Radar,” International Relations and 
Security Network (June 23, 2008).  http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Security-
Watch/Detail/?ots591=4888CAA0-B3DB-1461-98B9-E20E7B9C13D4&lng=en&id=57315.    
15 Gray, 283. 
16 Martin Butcher and Nicola Butler, “Bucharest Summit: U.S. Missile Defense Bases Continue to 
Divide NATO,” Disarmament Diplomacy 87 (Spring 2008): 73. 
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 A third factor that may explain the dichotomy between NATO and the United 
States on TMD and BMD policy is the decision making framework.  It is common for 
TMD systems to be developed and deployed via bilateral negotiations.  The only TMD 
project that has been subject to the consensus of the North Atlantic Council is the Active 
Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD), which is primarily a command 
and control system and which is commonly funded by several Allies.  This thesis 
investigates the hypothesis that the decision making framework may constitute a factor. 
 A fourth factor that may explain the NATO-U.S. rift is associated costs.  As 
previously stated, the United States is the Alliance’s largest source of missile defense 
technology and has borne most of the cost of TMD research and development.  Because 
of the prevalence of bilateral arrangements with TMD systems, only those Alliance 
members that wish to contribute financially are obliged to do so.  Because of the 
technical uncertainties associated with the BMD system, many Alliance members are 
concerned about the possible costs.  This thesis investigates the hypothesis that the costs 
associated with BMD constitute a factor. 
 The United States has consulted extensively with its NATO Allies about missile 
defense issues since the late 1960s.  Although these consultations have, since 2004, 
included the proposed deployment of BMD system elements in Poland and the Czech 
Republic, the U.S. government has not made its national BMD system development and 
deployment choices a subject for consensus decision-making in the North Atlantic 
Council.  As a U.S. Department of Defense official observed in March 2007, "NATO is a 
consensus organization, which means that we would have to try to achieve unanimity 
within the NATO context to get NATO to actually endorse a U.S. effort. . . In essence, 
what such an approach would do would allow any one nation within NATO to veto a 
U.S. initiative that we believe is very important to U.S. national security, in addition to 
European security.  I think we would be very reluctant to go down that path."  Moreover, 





                                                
Most of its capabilities are actually developed by individual nations or smaller groupings 
within NATO that develop a particular capability, and then offer those capabilities in the 
context of the NATO alliance."17   
 The United States has accordingly sought bilateral agreements with selected 
Allies, including the Czech Republic, Denmark, Poland, and the United Kingdom.  Since 
early 2007 these agreements (and negotiations about these agreements) have received 
greater attention in the Alliance.  As noted previously, at the April 2008 Bucharest 
Summit, the heads of state and government of the NATO Allies announced the following 
decision:  "Bearing in mind the principle of the indivisibility of Allied security as well as 
NATO solidarity, we task the Council in Permanent Session to develop options for a 
comprehensive missile defence architecture to extend coverage to all Allied territory and 
populations not otherwise covered by the United States system for review at our 2009 
Summit, to inform any future political decision."18 
 Another explanation for the controversy within the Alliance associated with BMD 
(as opposed to TMD) may be the perception that it could disrupt the security status quo 
and affect relations with Russia.19  This thesis investigates the hypothesis that a fifth 
cause of disagreement over BMD policy between the United States and NATO is concern 
about of the possible effects that a BMD system might have on the security status quo 
and Russian relations.  In contrast to TMD systems, if deployed in substantial numbers 
and if technically reliable, BMD systems could severely alter existing security 
relationships by limiting the effectiveness of an adversary’s ICBMs and SLBMs.  The 
predominant third party opposition has come from Russia.  Moscow argues that the 
proposed U.S. BMD system would be able to defeat Russian ICBMs.  Central and 
Eastern European Countries are primarily affected by Russian opposition because it 
might damage their relations with Russia and put their security at risk if Moscow takes 
countermeasures. 
 
17 Brian Green, Testimony before the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed Services 
Committee, “Hearing on the Fiscal Year Defense Authorization Budget Request for Missile Defense 
Programs,” March 27, 2007.  http://www.house.gov/hasc/hearing_information.shtml.   
18 “Bucharest Summit Declaration.”   
19 Butcher and Butler, 74. 
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 The findings reached in this thesis conclude that two of the tested hypotheses 
explain the divergence in BMD policy.  First, the decision-making framework regarding 
BMD systems is different from the decision-making framework regarding TMD systems.  
The decision to procure TMD systems has historically been made at the national level, 
outside of the North Atlantic Council.  The key difference between the decision-making 
process for TMD and that for BMD is that BMD has the potential to affect the Alliance 
as a whole, regardless of an individual Ally’s desires.  With TMD systems, only the 
Allies that wish to participate are affected in specific situations by operations involving 
TMD assets.  Many of the European members of the Alliance want the BMD system to 
be developed jointly to ensure that their specific economic, geopolitical, and security 
concerns are addressed.  Second, Europeans are more sensitive to the affects that the 
proposed BMD U.S. BMD system could have on Russian relations.  Despite 
Washington’s efforts to broker an acceptable deal, Moscow continues to create tension 
within the Alliance through its objection to the proposed BMD system.  Europeans are 
reluctant to pursue a policy which may have negative impacts on NATO-Russian 
relations.  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 The threat to the Alliance is the primary question as the plausibility of the threat 
provides the main justification for the BMD system.  Two German analysts, Sascha 
Lange and Oliver Thränert, make several key assertions regarding the threat posed by 
Iran.  First, “missiles are not weapons of mass destruction until they carry nuclear 
warheads.” 20   Second, developing multistage ICBMs is a complex task that requires a 
lot of technological expertise.  Most of the current Iranian missile technology has been 
imported, and the Iranians will not indigenously develop any long-range missiles in the 
near or medium term. 21  Finally, Iran is unlikely to import the technology to produce 
ICBMs or import complete missile systems because North Korea has a limited amount of 
 
20 Sascha Lange and Oliver Thränert, “Missile Defense in and for Europe?” German Institute for 
International Security Affairs (April 2007): 1. 
http://www.swpberlin.org/en/common/get_document.php?asset_id=3917.   
21 Ibid. 
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Taepodong missiles, and Pyongyang would most likely not be willing to sell them.22  
Lange and Thränert acknowledge that missile technology is spreading but maintain that 
there is no immediate or short term threat posed by Iran or any other Middle Eastern 
state.   
 Arguing from a German perspective, Alexander Bitter says that Iran and Pakistan 
pose the main threats to European security.23  But, “in general the Federal government 
[of Germany] and NATO should not narrow their field of vision needlessly by only 
considering a few risk nations.  The American government’s concentration on Tehran and 
Pyongyang is shortsighted.”24  For if the BMD system was justified by only one or two 
threats, what would happen if those threats ceased to exist?    
 Colin Gray attributes the rift in U.S. and European views on BMD policy to two 
main factors.  First, European views have been shaped in a security environment in which 
vulnerability and insecurity are normal and in which periods of peace are more akin to 
interwar periods.  Unilateral defense policies are much harder to carry out without 
threatening one’s neighbors on a crowded continent.  This constant threat and experience 
of war has shaped a European approach that is hard for Americans to understand.25  
Europeans “are reluctant to fuel any policy commitment that might subvert a security 
order which appears to be working well enough.”26 
 Second, Gray holds, geopolitics explain why Europe is much more interested in 
intentions than capabilities.  Europeans are used to sharing a continent and borders with 
enemies that could do great harm.  Therefore, according to Gray, 
European strategic culture assumes: the persistence of a complex political-
strategic context, wherein several or more major players have to be taken 
seriously on their own terms; that national security depends upon a multi-
skeined tapestry of political arrangements, attitudes, and capabilities; and 
that political intentions are for capabilities as three to one.  Because no 
 
22 Lange and Thränert, 1. 
23 Alexander Bitter, “NATO and Missile Defence: Implications for Germany Before the Bucharest 
Summit in 2008,” German Institute for International and Security Affairs (December 2007): 7.   http://swp-
berlin.org/en/common/get_document.php?asset_id=4548. 
24 Ibid., 8.  
25 Gray, 282. 
26 Gray, 282. 
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capabilities.27 
alition of the willing,’ but such coalitions usually don’t have strong 
tall a
nd population centers is technically possible.  Bernd Kreienbaum notes that since the 
                                                
European polity has been able to secure its national survival or well being 
strictly by means of national military defense, Europeans reflexively focus 
more upon a putative foe’s intentions than upon his assessed 
 
 Martin Butcher and Nicola Butler maintain that the U.S. administration made a 
diplomatic blunder in attempting to broker bilateral deals with certain Allies instead of 
making BMD decisions subject to consensus in the North Atlantic Council.28  Speaking 
on American bilateral diplomacy, U.S. Congressional Representative Ellen Tauscher 
states, “I have been concerned that the administration initially sought to bypass NATO on 
this issue and move forward on a bilateral basis with Poland and the Czech Republic.  I 
thought this was a mistake and publicly voiced my concerns…sometimes it’s faster to 
work with a ‘co
foundations.”29  
 Even if a consensus is reached that a threat exists, the next question is whether the 
technology currently exists to defeat ICBMs.  Gustav Lindstrom, a Swedish researcher at 
the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, in February 2008 pointed out that since 2002, tests 
of the United States BMD system have produced mixed results.  In his view the data 
produced have shown that the current BMD system cannot be classified as effective.  
Despite the mixed test results of the three-stage BMD system, the United States plans to 
ins  two-stage interceptor missile in Europe, one that has had no flight tests to date.30  
 The U.S. BMD system may lack sufficient testing, but NATO’s MD-FS 





27 Gray, 283. 
28 Butler and Butcher, 74. 
29 Ellen Tauscher, “European Missile Defense: A Congressional Perspective,” Arms Control Today 
37:8 (October 2007): 9. 
30 Gustav Lindstrom, Missile Defence in Europe- The Poltical and Security Dimensions,” European 
Union Institute for Security Policy (February 2008): 4. http://www.iss.europa.eu/ 
uploads/media/policyBrief_001.pdf. 
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 many national experts within and outside NATO 
 shorter 
work of the ABM treaty and do not threaten a major 
power’s strategic missile force. 
                                                
 
inception of the MD-FS in 2002, the progress of “industry, NC3A [NATO Consultation, 
Command and Control Agency] and
committees has been remarkable.” 31 
 Offering an explanation for NATO’s commitment to TMD, Richard Sokolsky 
acknowledged that TMD is a much more politically acceptable form of missile defense 
than a BMD system.  TMD elements already exist, provide protection against
range TBMs, and pose much fewer diplomatic problems with Russia or China. 32 
 Berd Kubbig further elucidates the attractiveness of TMD over BMD when he 
places the latter in the context of the ABM Treaty, which was in force from 1972 to 2002.  
While no longer in force, “the ABM Treaty had a symbolic and a stability-related 
relevance. It stood for detente, cooperation and the support of the agreement-based 
variant of arms control.  Its major achievements were widely lauded, including 
accountable partners, technically verifiable and politically irreversible results, as well as a 
predictable relationship between (antagonistic) countries. Many of these traditional 
American allies – notably Canada, Germany and the Netherlands – internalized these 
norms; they became part of their foreign policy culture.”33  Kubbig’s portrait of the ABM 
Treaty experience is idealized, in that it omits the disputes between Moscow and 
Washington over ABM Treaty compliance.  (Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard 
Shevardnadze admitted in 1989 that Moscow had violated the ABM Treaty in 
constructing the Krasnoyarsk radar.)  Moreover, the ABM Treaty obviously did not 
produce “politically irreversible results,” because the treaty came to an end.  TMD 
systems are nonetheless much more attractive politically than BMD systems because they 
were allowed within the frame
 
31 Bernd Kreienbaum, “Missile Defence Feasibility Study: NATO’s Baseline for the Political and 
Military Debate on Protecting Alliance Cities and Population Against Ballistic Missiles,” Military 
Technology (September 2006): 55. 
32 Richard Sokolsky, “European Missile Defense-Issues and Opinions,” Joint Forces Quarterly 29 
(Autumn 2001-Winter 2002): 47-48. 
33 Bernd W. Kubbig, “Introduction: The Domestic Politics of Missile Defense,” Contemporary 
Security Policy 26:3 (December 2005): 388. 
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E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
 This thesis utilizes existing analytical sources and case studies which examine 
threat assessments, technical uncertainties, bilateral negotiations, costs, and the effects 
that a missile defense shield might have on the security status quo and MD cooperation 
with Russia.  These sources are examined according to their relevance to TMD and BMD 
and the implications for TMD and BMD are compared.   
 The majority of existing scholarship focuses on the political aspect of the debate 
for several reasons.  First, the current rift between the U.S. and the Alliance is one that 
will be resolved primarily by political means, whatever the technical merits of any BMD 
system.  Second, the technical aspects of missile defense systems are usually classified, 
making full disclosure impossible.  Finally, missile defense systems are highly technical, 
with numerous nuances that take years of experience to fully understand.   
 Therefore, the technical aspect of this thesis will be drawn from the author’s own 
experience as Top Gun trained Patriot system operator and tactician with joint and 
multinational experience with NATO and non-NATO U.S. allies.  The author is familiar 
with the technical capabilities of all of the U.S. TMD systems, including Patriot, 
THAAD, AEGIS, and the Israeli Arrow system. 34    
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
 The thesis is organized into four chapters which investigate the comparative 
differences in the five hypotheses as they relate to U.S. and NATO policy concerning 
TMD and BMD.  The first chapter consists of the introduction in which the research 
question and thesis overview are provided.  Chapter II analyzes threat assessments, 
technical uncertainties, decision-making frameworks, costs and the effects that missile 
defenses might have on the security status quo, and dialogue and cooperation with Russia 
as they pertain to TMD.  Chapter III analyzes the same issues as they pertain to BMD and 
draws contrasts with TMD.  Chapter IV offers conclusions. 
 
34 The Arrow system is an upper tier system that was developed jointly by the United States and Israel 
and  served as the technological basis for the U.S. THAAD system.   
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II. THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE (TMD) 
TMD of forward deployed troops is the type of missile defense associated with 
the least amount of discord within the Alliance.  This chapter explores explanations for 
this.  Five factors that may explain U.S. and NATO policy concerning TMD are 
investigated.    In general, the entire Alliance can agree that there is a common threat set, 
that the technological capabilities exist to defend against TBMs, and that a common 
decision making process behind procurement of TMD systems is desirable and feasible.  
While there may be an Alliance wide conception that TMD systems do not alter the 
security status quo, TMD systems may in some circumstances have effects comparable to 
those of a BMD system in their impact on the strategic interests of specific NATO Allies.  
Finally, NATO and the United States appear to be the primary interlocutors when it 
comes to dialogue and cooperation with Russia on TMD issues.  While the United States 
conducts extensive TMD cooperation with its allies outside of the Alliance, including 
Australia, Israel and Japan, Washington remains reluctant to cooperate with non-allied 
states that do not purchase American TMD systems. 
A. THREAT ASSESSMENT  
Short and medium range TBMs and rockets have been a threat to NATO since the 
formation of the Alliance and the proliferation of ballistic missiles and technology has 
continued steadily since then.  As of today, over 36 countries possess ballistic missiles 
and 15 countries are known to be producers of ballistic missiles.35  Peppino DeBiaso 
summarizes this trend: 
Over the past decade, in addition to the roughly two dozen states operating 
short-range ballistic missiles (up to 1,000 kilometers [km]), the number of 
countries with medium-range (1,000–2,500 km), intermediate-range 
(2,500–5,500 km), or intercontinental-range (greater than 5,500 km) 
ballistic missiles has increased from five to nine. Not only has the number 
of nations possessing ballistic missiles been growing, but this group also 
includes some of the most dangerous regimes, such as North Korea and 
Iran.36 
 
35 Andrew Feickert, Missile Survey: Ballistic and Cruise Missiles of Selected Foreign Countries, CRS 
Report for Congress, July 26, 2005, Order Code RL 30427, 3. 
36 Peppino A. DeBiaso, “Missile Defense and NATO Security,” Joint Forces Quarterly 51 (4th 
Quarter 2008): 47.   
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Over the past thirty years there have been at least ten conflicts in which TBMs 
were launched.  During the Iran-Iraq conflict in the 1980s, conventional and WMD-
equipped missiles were launched against military and civilian targets.37  “In regional 
wars, missile attacks and artillery fire on civilian population centers have become a 
standard form of combat, as the use of standoff weapons (usually cruise missiles or air-
to-surface guided weapons) against hostile military units, intelligence centers, terrorist 
camps, and WMD facilities has become a commonly-accepted U.S. military practice.”38 
Peppino DeBiaso finds a correlation between the proliferation of ballistic missiles 
and the corresponding proliferation of WMD.  While TBM and WMD are not 
synonymous, it would appear that the two are increasingly becoming so.  “First, there are 
more than 20 nations today that possess or are seeking to acquire nuclear, biological, or 
chemical capabilities that can be carried by ballistic missiles. Second, in the past decade, 
the proliferation of WMD technologies and the expertise required to ‘weaponize’ them 
have been accelerated by the willingness of both state and nonstate organizations to 
collaborate to advance these programs.”39  For these reasons, TBMs pose a serious threat 
to Alliance security.  
1. North Korea 
The TBM threat posed by North Korea to the Alliance is primarily through 
Pyongyang’s proven record of producing TBMs and its willingness to export ballistic 
missile and nuclear technology to Middle Eastern states.40  “North Korea has become the 
world’s most prolific exporter of ballistic missiles and related equipment, materials and 
technology,”41 and it does not appear as if this will change anytime soon as Pyongyang 
relies on missile sales for economic reasons.  Currently, North Korea lacks the capability 
to directly threaten any members of the Alliance with TBMs.  However, its TBM exports 
 
37 DeBiaso, 48. 
38 Feickert, 5. 
39 DeBiaso, 47-48. 
40 DeBiaso, 47. 
41 “North Korea's Weapons Programmes: A Net Assessment,” The International Institute for Strategic 
Studies, http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers/north-korean-dossier/north-koreas-weapons-
programmes-a-net-asses/north-koreas-ballistic-missile-programme/.   
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to Middle Eastern states constitute a direct threat to Alliance security.  “Since 1980, it has 
supplied Middle Eastern countries, such as Iran, Iraq, Yemen, and Syria, but also Egypt 
and Libya, with over 400 Scud-class ballistic missiles.”42  North Korea’s missile program 
is based primarily on Soviet Scud missile technology which it has continued to 
indigenously build upon.   
North Korea possesses several short range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) and one 
proven medium range ballistic missile (MRBM) that it has sold internationally.  The 
Hwasong 5, Hwasong 6, and Hwasong 7 missiles are respectively the North Korean 
versions of the Soviet Scud B, C, and D missiles.  Scud missiles are antiquated, single 
stage, liquid filled ballistic missiles based on German V2 technology.  The Hwasong 5 
has a range of 300km and is capable of carrying a payload of 1000kg.  The Hwasong 6 
has an extended range of 500km which is achieved by decreasing its payload to 700 to 
800kg.43  The Hwasong 7 missile has a range of up to 700km with a payload similar to 
that of the Hwasong 6.44  While North Korea no longer produces or exports the Hwasong 
missiles, they are significant because these exports during the 1980s provided many 
Middle Eastern countries with the basis for their own missile force as many of them took 
North Korean technology and built upon it.   
The No-dong missile is an MRBM with a range of up to 1,300 km.  The No-dong 
has been exported to several countries which have used this missile to reverse engineer its 
technology in order to design and build their own MRBMs.  Iran and Pakistan both have 
variants of the No-dong, which owe their creation to the purchase of North Korean 
missiles and technology. 
2. Iran 
The Iranian missile program has relied heavily on the importation of technology 
from North Korea, the Soviet Union and China.  Iran now produces numerous solid 
fueled rockets (Zelzal, Fateh, and Fajr) which have the range to be classified as SRBMs 
 
42 “The Threat: North Korea,” Missile Threat, 
http://www.missilethreat.com/thethreat/pageID.249/default.asp.   
43 “North Korea's Weapons Programmes: A Net Assessment.” 
44 “The Threat: North Korea.” 
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(that is, from 100km to 1,000km).  In addition to their indigenous rocket program, the 
Iranians have developed the Shahab family of missiles based on the Soviet Scud and 
North Korean No-dong missiles.  In the Middle East Iran poses the most significant TMD 
threat to the Alliance “because it unites a vigorous ballistic missile program, development 
of key capabilities needed to produce nuclear weapons, the demonstrated use of missile-
delivered chemical weapons (against Iraq in the 1980s), and the stated desire to destroy 
nearby countries.”45  Additionally, Iran has a history of supporting terrorist groups and 
during the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah conflict Iran supplied Hezbollah with Katyusha 
shoulder-fired rockets and Zelzal rockets which were launched against Israeli cities.
 The Shahab-3 missile is an MRBM that has a known range of 1,300km, and Iran 
has recently tested a Shahab-3 with a claimed range of 2,000km.46  In addition to the 
Shahab-3 and its extended range variants, Iran is working on the Shahab-4 and Shahab-5 
which could have ranges up to 4,000km.  Currently, the 2,000km Shahab-3 has the range 
to strike anywhere in Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, and Turkey and in parts of Hungary 
and Slovenia.  A 4,000km IRBM will threaten all but three members of the Alliance 
(Canada, Portugal, and the United States). 
3. UAV/LACM 
 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and Land Attack Cruise Missiles (LACMs) 
have emerged in the past decade as serious threat.  In the most recent threat assessment 
by the U.S. National Air and Space Intelligence Center, LACMs pose a serious threat 
because:  
Proliferation of land attack cruise missiles will expand in the next 
decade…The majority of new LACMs will be very accurate, 
conventionally armed, and available for export. The high accuracy of 
many LACMs will allow them to inflict serious damage on important 





45 DeBiaso, 47. 
46 “Iran Test-Fires Shahab-3 Long Range Missile,” Russian News and Information Agency. 
http://en.rian.ru/world/20080709/113564266.html. 
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warheads….U.S. defense systems could be severely stressed by low-flying 
stealthy cruise missiles that can simultaneously attack a target from 
several directions.47 
All TMD systems possess a measure of capability against UAVs and LACMs, 
and this versatility (in addition to maneuverability) makes TMD systems highly 
attractive.   
B. TECHNICAL UNCERTAINTIES  
 TMD systems have made substantial improvements since their first combat 
appearance during the 1991 Gulf War where American Patriot batteries had a paltry 9% 
interception rate.48  During Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, every Iraqi TBM that 
threatened a coalition asset was successfully intercepted.  Today the TMD systems of the 
United States and other NATO nations are combat proven and generally viewed as 
reliable and essential combat assets for the protection of forward deployed troops.  
Members of the Alliance currently field an assortment of lower and upper tier TMD 
systems that have been predominately developed by the United States.     
1. Lower Tier TMD Systems 
Boost, midcourse, and terminal phase are terms used to define the phases of flight 
for all ballistic missiles, and these flight phases correspond to the level at which a TMD 
system will engage.  As noted in the introduction, a lower tier system is only capable of 
lower altitude engagements when the TBM is in its terminal phase.  This is the most 
difficult time to engage a TBM for three reasons.  First, the TBM approaches its greatest 
speed in its terminal phase of flight.  When the speed of the interceptor is factored in, it is 
not uncommon to see closing velocities of over 3km per second.  This immense closing 
velocity means that the interceptors and guidance systems have little room for error and 
no time for a second shot should the first interceptor miss.  Second, most SRBMs and 
some MRBMs that are built by states other than Russia or China are of relatively poor 
 
47Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat (Wright Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio: National Air and Space 
Intelligence Center, March 2006), 25. 
48 Dennis M. Gormley, “Missile Contagion,” Survival 50:4 (August/September 2008): 143. 
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quality.  This means that they are inaccurate and susceptible to reentry problems when 
they descend into the atmosphere.  Reentry problems include tumbling (the warhead 
begins to tumble end over end instead of maintaining a ballistic flight path) and breaking 
apart (the missile disintegrates and a debris field accompanies the warhead, making 
discrimination difficult for the TMD system).  While reentry problems affect all SRBMs, 
MRBMs, and ICBMs, they are more prevalent in SRBMs because they are usually single 
stage missiles, which means that the warhead does not separate from the body.  A 
warhead that has separated from the booster is much more aerodynamic, decreasing the 
drag when re-entering the atmosphere.  Finally, any counter measures that are deployed 
by incoming TBMs are done so in the midcourse phase.  This means that lower tier 
systems have to discriminate against decoys, maneuvering re-entry vehicles, and multiple 
reentry vehicles in the terminal phase. 
The engagement envelope (or range) of lower tier TMD systems is restricted by 
two factors: the detection range of the radar and the range of the interceptors.  Radars 
require an immense amount of power to function.  TMD radars cannot be larger than a 
certain physical size in order to maintain maneuverability.  Moreover, they must be 
capable of generating a certain level of electrical power.  As a result, lower tier TMD 
systems rely heavily on external early warning sources for cueing because outside radars 
can detect incoming TBMs more promptly than the radar integral to lower tier TMD 
systems.  If a radar is directed to search a specific area for an anticipated TBM, it can 
detect and intercept it more quickly by narrowing its search area and directing more 
power to that area.  This means that lower tier TMD systems will only be able to engage 
SRBMs and some MRBMs without cueing, as IRBMs and ICBMs move too fast to allow 
sufficient time for detection and engagement.  While lower tier systems can only 
intercept slower, shorter-range TBMs, they are much more deployable than upper tier 
systems and can easily maintain protection of forward maneuver forces.  Additionally, 
lower tier systems can engage a wider threat set, such as aircraft (rotary and fixed wing), 
UAVs and LACMs.  This deployability and effectiveness against a wide threat set make 
lower tier TMD systems attractive.  
 21
                                                
The most recent developments in lower tier systems have indicated a shift in the 
world of air defense.  First, UAVs and LACMs have encouraged the development of 
lower tier systems that have decreased performance against TBMs and increased 
performance against UAVs and LACMs.  Second, upper tier systems are currently 
achieving an operational capability to engage TBMs with ranges greater than 500km, 
meaning that lower tier systems only have to engage SRBMs.  
a. Patriot  
The Patriot system is one of two TMD assets that are currently fielded by 
members of the Alliance.  The Patriot system has been developed exclusively by the 
United States over the past 50 years and has undergone several iterations.  The most 
current versions, Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC) 2 and 3, are vast improvements over 
the Patriot system that debuted in the 1991 Iraq War.  After going through numerous 
upgrades, the PAC 2 and PAC 3 systems of today have a high degree of lethality against 
most TBMs with a range of less than 2000km.  The Patriot system is maneuverable, 
deployable and effective against a wide variety of threats (SRBMs, MRBMs, UAVs, 
LACMs, and aircraft).  The most current version, the PAC 3, experienced great success in 
the 2003 Iraq War.  
In the past 15 years the United States has sold the Patriot system to several 
members of the Alliance and currently Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, and Spain 
have Patriot Fire Units (FUs).  The U.S. currently has over 30 Patriot FUs deployed 
throughout the world.  The U.S. fire units are the only NATO TMD assets that have 
successfully engaged TBMs in conflict.  The U.S. Patriot system has evolved greatly 
since its first use in battle during the 1991 Gulf War where it had a less than impressive 
record.49    This enhanced lethality was displayed during Operation Iraqi Freedom in 
2003, when every Scud that was launched at a Patriot defended asset was successfully 
intercepted.50  Despite its success, the Patriot system is ageing, and the emerging threats 
 
49 Steven A. Hildreth.  Ballistic Missile Defense: A Historical Overview. CRS Report for Congress, 
January 5, 2007, Order Code RS 22120, 6. 
50 Charles A. Anderson, “Air and Missile Defense: Operation Iraqi Freedom,” Army Magazine 
(January 1, 2004). http://www.ausa.org/webpub/DeptArmyMagazine.nsf/byid/CCRN-6CCSBH.    
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of UAVs and LACMs have shown its limitations.  Its primary deficiencies derive from 
the fact that it is designed to engage TBMs.  As a result it has a limited search sector of 
90 degrees and interceptors with a limited range.  This means that the Patriot system has 
to be oriented toward the threat in order to achieve a successful detection. 
b. SAMP/T  
The SAMP/T system currently fielded by France and Italy is significant 
because it was developed jointly by the two countries over the course of the past 20 years 
without American assistance.51  The design of the system reflects the emergence of 
UAVs and LACMs as a more serious threat than TBMs from the French and Italian 
perspective.  First, the SAMP/T is the first TMD system to be fielded by any Alliance 
member that provides 360 degree coverage.  Such coverage is crucial to the detection of 
UAVs and LACMs because they can be launched from anywhere on the battlefield.  For 
example, during the 2003 Iraq War U.S. Patriot batteries maneuvered past Iraqi LACM 
units and could not detect LACMs launched from behind their positions.  Second, the 
SAMP/T interceptor is a two stage missile with a range of 120km.  A two stage missile 
provides a longer flight time, which is necessary to intercept low-altitude slow moving 
targets with unpredictable flight paths.  Finally, the SAMP/T is designed to be effective 
only against SRBMs with a range of less than 600km, in addition to aircraft, UAVs, and 
LACMs.52   
c. MEADS  
In 1996, NATO created the Medium Extended Air Defense System 
(MEADS) Management Agency (NAMEADSMA) for the purpose of managing the 
MEADS project.  The MEADS project is significant because it is the first NATO-led 
project in the field of missile defense.  The primary developers are the United States 
 
51 The acronym SAMP/T stands for sol-air moyenne portée-terrestre, that is, a ground based surface-
to-air medium-range missile. 
52 “Aster 30 SAMP/T – Surface-to-Air Missile Platform / Terrain, Europe,” Army-Technology. 
http://www.army-technology.com/projects/aster-30/.   
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(58%), Germany (25%) and Italy (17%).53  In June 2005, NAMEADSMA decided to 
extend the MEADS contract for another nine years, taking the project through design and 
development to its projected fielding in 2014.  Initial flight tests are planned to begin in 
2011.54  The goal of the MEADS is to develop a more deployable and maneuverable 
replacement for the Patriot system with capabilities similar to those of the SAMP/T 
system.  Another MEADS advantage is that it will provide 360 degree coverage while 
Patriot only provides a limited, directional search sector.   
d. ALTBMD 
NATO’s Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) 
program is scheduled to produce a Command and Control (C2) system for the 
coordination of national TMD systems such as Patriot, MEADS, and SAMP-T, and will 
have an Initial Operational Capability (IOC) of 2010.  After completing an initial 
feasibility study in 2001 with Lockheed-Martin Missiles, a consortium led by Fire 
Control and Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) was formally 
awarded a contract to construct an ALTBMD test bed at the 2006 Riga Summit.55 
The goal for the ALTBMD system is to integrate lower and upper tier 
TMD systems into a NATO-developed C2 system.  “The system will be able to integrate 
different TMD systems (such as PATRIOT, the NATO MEADS system, SAMP-T) into a 
single coherent, deployable defensive network able to give layered protection against 
incoming ballistic missiles.”56  When the ALTBMD system is fully functional, the lower 





53 “MEADS: Medium Extended Air Defense System, Germany/Italy/USA,” Army-Technology. 
http://www.army-technology.com/projects/meads/.   
54 Ibid.   
55 “NATO Agrees On Missile Defence Way Forward,” NATO's Nations and Partners for Peace 3 
(2007): 151. 
56 “Launch of NATO’s Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) Programme,” 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization.  http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2005/p05-036e.htm.   
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and SAMP/T systems will serve as the lower tier TMD systems.  The objective of the 
lower tier systems would be to “provide protection from aircraft, cruise missiles and 
ballistic missiles with ranges below 1,000 km.”57  
The upper tier will be comprised of the U.S. THAAD and AEGIS BMD 
systems.  The two layers will work in tandem to defeat all types of threats, with the lower 
tier focusing on the emerging UAV and LACM threats and the upper tier being 
responsible for TBMs.   The ALTBMD will play a critical role by providing the battle 
management, communications, command and control, and intelligence (BMC3I), as well 
as early warning dissemination.58 
2. Upper Tier TMD Systems 
Upper tier TMD systems offer many advantages over lower tier systems when it 
comes to missile defense.  First, upper tier systems are capable of midcourse phase 
engagements.  The midcourse phase of flight for a TBM is the period of time after the 
boost phase ends until the TBM re-enters the earth’s atmosphere.  In the midcourse 
phase, the TBM is traveling at its slowest rate of speed and along its most constant flight 
path.  Additionally, the TBM has not yet reentered the atmosphere and has not been 
subjected to the stress that leads to break up and tumbling.   Second, the radars utilized by 
the upper tier system are several times more powerful and can detect a TBM earlier than 
lower tier systems.  Finally, since upper tier systems are capable of long range 
engagements, they still have time to employ the shoot-look-shoot method whereby 
another interceptor can be fired should the first one miss.  Lower tier systems have to 
launch two missiles (the salvo method of fire) at every TBM since there is not sufficient 
time to reengage should the first interceptor miss. 
 
57 Lothar Ibrugger, “Missile Defences and Weapons in Space,” (Rapporteur before the NATO 
Parliamentary Assembly, 169 STCMT 04).  http://www.nato-
pa.int/Default.asp?CAT2=471&CAT1=6&CAT0=2&COM=497&MOD=0&SMD=0&SSMD=0&ST=&ID
=0&PAR=0&PRINT=1.  
58 “Missile Defence: What Does This Mean in Practice?” North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 
http://www.nato.int/issues/missile_defence/practice.html.   
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a. AEGIS BMD 
Aegis BMD is a U.S. Navy upper tier system that is operational.  By 2009 
the Navy expects to have equipped 18 ships with the system.59  The Aegis BMD system 
is capable of both exo- and endo-atmospheric engagements of SRBMs, MRBMs, and 
IRBMs by using two different missile types.  The Standard Missile 2 (SM-2) is utilized 
for terminal phase engagements while the Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) is used for 
midcourse engagements.  In addition to missile defense, the Aegis radar plays a crucial 
role in the TMD architecture by providing early warning and cueing to lower tier 
systems.  The United States has already sold Aegis systems to Japan and is in various 
stages of talks with Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. 
In addition to its capability as an upper tier system, one of the primary 
advantages of Aegis BMD is that it is a naval asset.  This means that the system can be 
rapidly deployed and is self-contained.  This naval benefit is also its largest draw back as 
it can only provide coastal defense.60  However, the range of the radar is sufficient to 
provide early warning and cueing for most TMD elements on the ground. 
b. THAAD 
The U.S. Army’s Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system 
is a ground based, upper tier, long range TMD system that is capable of intercepting 
SRBMs, MRBMS, and shorter range IRBMs.  While the THAAD system is not yet 






59 “Frequently Asked Questions,” Missile Defense Agency. 
http://www.mda.mil/mdalink/html/faq.html.  
60 The footprint of the protected land area depends on numerous factors such as the type of threat, 
geographic features, and proximity to shore of the ship.    
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in early 2009 with a subsequent IOC in 2009.61  Currently, one X-Band THAAD radar is 
already deployed to Japan to “protect the United States and friends and allies from 
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and medium range threats.”62  
Today’s TMD architecture consisting of Patriot and AEGIS BMD is 
highly capable but does have some shortcomings.  First, as noted previously, AEGIS 
BMD is a naval asset and is restricted in its deployment and defense capabilities.  Only 
assets along the coast and at sea can be defended.  It can, however, serve a critical role as 
an early warning system for Patriot.  Second, no capable BMC3I system exists for the 
integration of air defense and air assets.  The lack of integration of battlefield air defense 
assets had disastrous affects during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).  Two separate Patriot 
FUs, which were not integrated into a common air defense network, mistakenly classified 
two coalition aircraft (a British Tornado and a U.S. Navy FA-18) as missiles and engaged 
them as such.63  In addition to these two fratricides, there were numerous “over 
engagements,” with multiple fire units engaging the same target because they were not 
integrated into a common air defense network.  Integration into a common network, such 
as the planned ALTBMD, is intended to help prevent the recurrence of such events. 
The TMD programs being conducted by NATO and the United States are 
on convergent paths.  Each Ally’s national defense policies determine its level of 
involvement in TMD efforts, and it would be an impossible task for NATO to create the 
necessary consensus to develop an Allied TMD system.  NATO is filling its role by 
creating the ALTBMD network, which will integrate Allied lower and upper tier TMD 
systems into a common network that is designed to reduce the likelihood of “over 
engagements” and target misclassification.   
 
61 “Defeating Ballistic Missiles in the Late-Midcourse and Terminal Phase,” Lockheed-Martin. 
http://www.lockheedmartin.com/data/assets/4474.pdf.  
62 “Fact Sheet: Forward Deployable Radars,” Missile Defense Agency. 
http://www.mda.mil/mdalink/pdf/fdr.pdf.   
63 “Preventing Fratricide,” Technology Review. http://www.technologyreview.com/Biztech/14493/. 
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C. DECISION-MAKING FRAMEWORK OF TMD 
 Because there is a genuine threat and the technology exists to defeat that threat, 
TMD decision making within the alliance has revolved around capabilities rather than 
politics.  The Dutch view of TMD is similar to that of most Allies – that is, that TMD is 
an “adaptation of defensive capabilities against potential or already existing threats, made 
possible by new technologies, particularly…ballistic and cruise missiles of short 
ranges.”64  What has developed is a process in which Canada and the European members 
of the Alliance have allowed the United States to bear most of the research and 
development costs, while they have borne limited purchasing costs.  With the exception 
of the SAMP/T, every TMD system fielded within the Alliance was developed almost 
exclusively by the United States.  The United States has had little input from most of the 
other members of the Alliance in its design and development of TMD systems and has 
borne willingly most of the costs.   
The national development of TMD systems is crucial because NATO relies on the 
military capabilities of individual member states.  Walter Slocombe has summarized the 
situation as follows:  
Practically every defence-procurement decision by a NATO member is 
ultimately a unilateral choice.  While agreed NATO priorities are often a 
factor, the degree to which NATO’s defence-planning mechanism 
influences any individual ally’s programme is limited.  NATO itself has 
almost no military assets of its own; virtually all the actual military power 
the Alliance could muster depends, as would access to European-based 
missile defence, on national decisions to commit nationally owned assets 
in particular circumstances.65 
 Because NATO relies on nationally owned TMD assets it is critical that adequate 
TMD assets be developed within the Alliance, either unilaterally or multilaterally.  
However, multilateral weapons development, especially of highly technical TMD 
systems, is a difficult task; and these difficulties help to explain the disproportionate 
American share of TMD technology.  First, group efforts are extremely difficult to 
 
64 Philip Everts, “The Netherlands: Procurement Without Debate,” Contemporary Security Policy 
26:3 (December 2005): 558. 
65 Walter B. Slocombe, “Europe, Russia and American Missile Defence,” Survival 50: 2 (April 2008): 
22-23. 
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manage because of the divergence of interests.  Countries have different budgets, 
different procurement procedures, different levels of technological expertise, and 
different goals for TMD systems.  Second, the motives for participation in a particular 
TMD project vary substantially and can prove to be a benefit or a hindrance.   
An example of the problems associated with multilateral TMD projects is the 
MEADS project.  During the early 1990s the Germans and the Americans had been 
independently working on a TMD system that would replace Patriot (the American goal) 
and Hawk (the German goal).  When the two sides conducted talks, they discovered that 
their prototypes were remarkably similar.  For economic reasons, the two sides decided to 
combine efforts to reduce the costs of developing independent systems.  However, during 
this same period, the French-Italian SAMP/T effort was under way, and the French and 
the Italians had been trying to solicit German participation for economic, technical, and 
political reasons.  The French and the Italians did not want the Germans to commit to the 
MEADS project because they feared that the Germans would then not support the 
SAMP/T project.  Additionally, the French and the Italians did not want to support 
MEADS because it was a non-European project which did not meet their needs.  Upon 
German commitment to the MEADS project, the French and the Italians also joined it 
because they were “concerned about having no role in such a major program that would 
compete with a SAMP/T upgrade.”66 
 In May 1996 the French withdrew from the MEADS project (most likely because 
the capabilities of SAMP/T are similar to those of MEADS).  However, contention 
continues among the MEADS project partners in the face of economic and technological 
issues.  The Germans are frustrated that the Americans have dominated the project and 
have not awarded contracts to German companies; and the Americans have also restricted 
Allied access to the technology of the system.67  “Washington was able to implement a 
 
 
66 David M. D’Agostino, “Transatlantic Cooperative Weapons Development: How Can We Better 
Ensure Success?” Acquisition Review Quarterly (Fall 1996): 140. 
67 Herman Hagena, “The Current Political and Technical Debate on Missile Defense in the United 
States and Missile Defense Option for Europe.  The Transatlantic Dimension: Patriot and MEADS,” (Paper 
presented at the Conference of Arbeitskreis Raketenabwehr der HSFK Arbeitsstelle Friedensforschung 
Deutscher Wissenschaftler, Bonn, Germany, November 3, 2003). 
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highly restrictive deal over the sharing of its cutting-edge technology with the European 
junior partners – this was an outcome which reflects the strictly asymmetrical 
transatlantic relationship in this area.”68 
As previously stated, TMD systems receive less political attention than BMD 
systems because they are justified by a proven threat and the technology’s effectiveness 
has been demonstrated.  TBMs have been launched multiple times in combat, and during 
both Iraq Wars (1991 and 2003) coalition forces came under TBM fire.  With more 
NATO countries sending troops to out of area missions, most governments have become 
convinced of the need for TMD.  According to Mark Bromley of the British American 
Security Council, “European government officials recently have been more publicly 
willing to discuss missile threats.  This new public stance could be reflective of an 
increased willingness on the part of European governments to pursue more ambitious 
TMD systems.”69 
In addition to the proven threat and technology, economics has emerged as a 
strong variable in TMD development.  Europeans are becoming increasingly interested in 
TMD systems because of the emergence of domestic technology firms that are capable of 
producing systems whose quality is comparable to that of American systems.  In a 
situation similar to American politics, domestic defence companies are beginning to 
increase their pressure on national governments to award defence contracts to European 
industries.  “One of the factors influencing Europe’s interest in TMD systems is an 
increasingly resurgent domestic missile industry.  The European missile industry is now 
able to compete globally in a market niche in the past the reserve of the larger US firms, 
such as Raytheon and Lockheed Martin.”70  Gradually, European firms are beginning to 
win more defence contracts and have a greater stake in the research, development, and 
production of TMD systems.   
 
68 Bernd W. Kubbig, “Introduction: The Domestic politics of Missile Defence,” Contemporary 
Security Policy 26: 3 (December 2005): 402. 
69 Mark Bromley, “European Missile Defence: New Emphasis, New Roles,” British American 
Security Council (May 15, 2001). http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Papers/BP36.htm.    
70 Ibid. 
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D. COSTS AND THE EFFECTS THAT TMD MIGHT HAVE ON THE 
SECURITY STATUS QUO 
TMD systems are often viewed as useful only for the protection of forward 
deployed troops or the point defense of small areas.  Because of this perceived limit, the 
effects that TMD systems could have on the security status quo have been viewed as 
relatively minimal.  This perception is erroneous, however.  While TMD systems are 
limited to only theater effectiveness, they may have an equal or greater impact on the 
security status quo than the proposed U.S. BMD system, because “a weapon to be used in 
a ‘theatre’ by one party can be seen as a strategic threat by another.”71 
For southern and eastern European NATO Allies, TMD is more strategically 
important than BMD because the primary threat posed to them is not from ICBMs, but 
from IRBMs, MRBMs and possibly SRBMs.72  A 1,300km Shahab-3 fired from Iran 
could strike any location in Turkey and some portions of Greece.  As previously 
mentioned, a 2,000km Shahab-3 could strike anywhere in Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, 
and Turkey and in small portions of Hungary and Slovenia.  While the trajectories of 
TBMs can be depressed or lofted to achieve the desired distance, it would be impossible 
to loft an ICBM’s trajectory in order to shorten its distance to strike southeastern Europe.  
To the countries that are within range of current Iranian missiles, TMD systems could 
provide a high level of protection and deterrence.   
TMD systems possess more than just point defense capabilities.  A single Patriot 
battalion (consisting of 4 fire units) can provide protection for a major metropolitan area 
and only one THAAD fire unit could provide protection for “ranges well beyond the 
defended area.”73  The Israeli Arrow system, which is largely based on the THAAD 
system, offers an example of the area coverage potential of an upper tier TMD system.  
Israel, which is larger than New Jersey, is protected by only two Arrow fire units.  In 
 
71 Everts, 567.  
72 Ronja Kempin and Jocelyn Mawdsley, “France: Missile Defence à la Française,” Contemporary 
Security Policy 26:3 (December 2005): 512. 
73 “Terminal High Area Altitude Defense,” Lockheed Martin. 
http://www.lockheedmartin.com/products/thaad/index.html.  
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addition to the area coverage potential, TMD systems can launch more interceptors than 
the proposed U.S. BMD system.  One Patriot fire unit has the ability to launch 16 PAC-3 
missiles and 20 PAC-2 missiles, which is substantially more than the proposed 10 
interceptors of the BMD system envisaged for deployment in Poland. 
Turkey is a prime example of the effect TMD could have on the security status 
quo within the region as TMD systems in Turkey would nullify the TBM threat posed by 
Middle Eastern states.  Turkey is on the front lines of the missile threat, and “there is a 
strong feeling among the public that there is a potential threat from the missiles of 
neighboring countries,”74 as debris from a Syrian missile fell in southeastern Turkey in 
May 2005.  However, Ankara is particularly constrained in its options because Turkey is 
caught between the security dynamics of the Middle East region and its relations with 
Europe, which involve distinct political considerations.75 
The primary reason for the mistaken impression that TMD does not affect the 
security status quo may reside in the legacy that the ABM Treaty has left.  Because the 
ABM Treaty constrained only defense against “strategic ballistic missiles,” as defined in 
the treaty and associated documents, many observers formed the impression that SRBMs, 
MRBMs, and IRBMs do not constitute a strategic missile threat.  The development and 
deployment of TMD systems were never restricted under the 1972 ABM Treaty, which 
was in force until June 2002.  As a result, TMD systems have always been much less 
politically contentious than BMD systems as they are perceived as being only for the 
protection of forward deployed troops and lack the capability to defend against Inter-
Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and Sea-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs).76   
Additionally, the spread of WMD and the capability to produce missiles that can 
carry them has meant a change in what constitutes a strategic missile force.  Now 
SRBMs, MRBMs, and IRBMs can constitute strategic missile forces because of the 
proximity of threatening states and the ability to equip them with WMD. 
 
74 Isil Kazan, “Turkey: Where Geopolitics Still Matter,” Contemporary Security Policy 26:3 
(December 2005): 595. 
75 Ibid., 597-598. 
76 Kubbig, 388. 
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E. DIALOGUE AND COOPERATION WITH RUSSIA AS IT PERTAINS TO 
TMD 
NATO has made extensive efforts through the NATO Russia Council (NRC) to 
conduct dialogue, research, development, and exercises to enhance TMD cooperation.   
The Theatre Missile Defence Ad Hoc Working Group (TMD-AHWG) was established in 
2004 to: 
[D]evelop and assess an Experimental Concept and an Experimental 
Concept of Operations (CONOPS); to explore and develop opportunities 
for intensified practical cooperation, including joint TMD training and 
exercises as well as the development of common terminology; and to 
conduct consultations and interoperability studies on respective TMD 
systems and system capabilities in order to analyse and evaluate levels of 
interoperability and the means to attain such interoperability.77 
Since 2004, the TMD-AHWG has conducted five joint NATO-Russia TMD 
exercises, with the most recent occurring in January 2008.78   
 For many of the same reasons that influence the TMD decision-making process 
within the Alliance, Moscow desires to become a purveyor of TMD technology.  
“Although generally unenthusiastic about American BMD programs, Russian officials 
have perennially hoped that NATO countries will purchase Russian TMD technologies 
and weapons systems.”79  However, there are many obstacles to NATO-Russia 
cooperation on TMD development.  First, NATO and Russia encounter numerous 
interoperability problems that limit the extent to which Russian and NATO systems could 
be integrated because they were not designed to be compatible.  Second, strong ties have 
already been built with NATO defense firms, and they have limited interest in working 
with Russian firms.  Finally, even if NATO defense firms were not opposed to working 
with Russian firms, the issue of foreign disclosure presents a serious obstacle.  Even 
among the NATO Allies, there is a high degree of information restriction (illustrated with 
 
77 “Theatre Missile Defense Ad-Hoc Working Group,” NATO Russia Council. http://www.nato-
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the MEADS project), and the amount of information restriction would only increase 
when dealing with Russia.  Additionally, there is the fear that Russia might pass acquired 
technology to China.80 
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III. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE (BMD) 
The United States and NATO appear to be taking divergent paths regarding BMD 
for the protection of NATO territory, forces and population centers.  This chapter 
explores possible explanations.  Five factors that may explain U.S. and NATO policy 
concerning BMD are investigated and contrasted with the findings regarding TMD in 
Chapter II.  In general, the United States and its NATO allies disagree over threat 
assessments, the technological feasibility of defending against ICBMs, the decision-
making framework, the effects that the proposed BMD system might have on the security 
status quo, and cooperation with Russia regarding the proposed BMD system. 
A. THREAT ASSESSMENT 
The threat assessment for BMD is a source of divergence within the Alliance for 
two reasons.  First, the strategic culture that exists in the United States and Europe exerts 
a strong influence over how various threats are perceived.  The development of strategic 
culture is a continuous process where a state’s world view has been, and continues to be, 
shaped by its historical experience, political culture, and geopolitical situation.81  These 
three elements interact with each other to produce “a distinctive political-strategic 
culture.”82  The world view that a state has developed will influence what it views as 
vital interests and potential threats.  According to Colin Gray, an expert at the National 
Institute for Public Policy, “Inter-allied discussion of BMD issues may appear to be about 
particular threat projections, for example, but in reality it is also about the contrasting 
worldviews bequeathed by history, culture, and geopolitics.”83   
Europeans have a similar strategic culture that has been largely shaped by the 
constant threat of war.  Since the 17th century, Europe has plunged itself into continental 
war multiple times (Thirty-Years War, Napoleonic Wars, and the World Wars).  
Europeans have become accustomed to a geopolitical situation where vulnerability and 
 
81 Colin S. Gray, “European Perspective on U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense,” Comparative Strategy 21 
(2002): 280. 
82 Ibid., 281. 
83 Gray, 280. 
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insecurity are the norm and periods of peace are more akin to interwar periods.84  
Europeans accept a security environment where they are sharing a continent with well 
armed neighbors and “they are most reluctant to help fuel any policy commitment (i.e., to 
homeland missile defense) that might subvert a security order which appears to be 
working well enough.”85   
The result of sharing a hostile, crowded continent has meant that Europeans have 
developed mechanisms for confronting threats that differ from American approaches.  
Europeans choose either to ally with the threatening state, to balance against the 
threatening state by entering into alliances with other menaced states, or simply to offer 
neutrality. 86  All three of these options rely on varying levels of cooperation, 
negotiation, and participation i
The American strategic culture is born from a unique historical experience, 
political culture, and geopolitical situation.  American security has never been seriously 
menaced and Washington has always had the freedom to conduct geopolitics without 
being subjected to the constraints that European governments face.  “Continental 
isolation has allowed the United States the luxury of choosing the time, place, and term 
of its lethal engagement in world affairs.”87 
The result is that the United States emphasizes a state’s capabilities in lieu of its 
intentions and prefers unilateral military confrontation as a means of dealing with 
perceived threats.  In addition to the preference for direct military confrontation, 
Americans are not accustomed to being a part of an alliance where they are not the sole 
super power.  This hegemonic existence means that the United States does not know how 
to defer to demands of other allies.88   
In addition to strategic culture, threat assessments concerning future ICBM assets 
in the hands of regional powers are based more on conjecture than demonstrated 
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capabilities.  China and Russia are the only non-Alliance members to possess operational 
ICBMs.  Allied views differ regarding the progress and speed of ICBM development in 
Iran and North Korea.  The U.S. “Intelligence Community assesses that Iran would be 
able to develop an ICBM before 2015 if it chose to do so,”89 and North Korea tested a 
multi-staged Taepo Dong 2 ICBM in July 2006.  From the American perspective, 
Tehran’s and Pyongyang’s efforts to acquire ICBMs signal their hostile intent.  European 
members of the Alliance agree that North Korea and Iran are progressing in their missile 
programs.  However, most European Allies appear to believe that the North Korean and 
Iranian missile programs are progressing at a slower pace than estimated by the United 
States and that capabilities do not equal intentions. 
1. The American Assessment  
 The United States views ICBMs and WMD as closely related capabilities.  From 
the perspective of American strategic culture, the only reason for a state to develop 
ICBMs is as a means to deliver WMD.  Arming an ICBM with a conventional warhead is 
not practical as they do not possess the level of precision necessary to ensure destruction 
of the target.  For example, the most accurate American ICBM, the Trident II D-5, only 
has a Circular Error Probable (CEP)90 of 122 meters.91  Moreover, as discussed in 
Chapter II, there is a correlation between the proliferation of ballistic missiles and WMD 
and this influences the American belief that ICBMs and WMD are related capabilities.   
 A survey of important U.S. BMD documents reveals that the U.S. objectives 
regarding missile defense have increasingly emphasized the need to counter WMD 
proliferation.  The National Defense Authorization Act for 1996, which identified areas 
of concern for the future of U.S. BMD strategy, only mentioned the terms WMD and 
missile defense in the same sentence once: 
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The deployment of ballistic missile defenses is a necessary, but not 
sufficient, element of a broader strategy to discourage both the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the proliferation of the 
means of their delivery and to defend against the consequences of such 
proliferation.92   
The 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) did not mention missile defense 
independently of WMD, and BMD was presented as a means to defeat WMD.  In the 
introduction to the NSS, President George W. Bush cited ballistic missiles as one of the 
primary means of delivery for WMD: 
Our enemies have openly declared that they are seeking weapons of mass 
destruction, and evidence indicates that they are doing so with 
determination.  The United States will not allow these efforts to succeed.  
We will build defenses against ballistic missiles and other means of 
delivery.93 
Section V of the NSS was entitled “Prevent Our Enemies from Threatening Us, 
Our Allies, and Our Friends with Weapons of Mass Destruction,” and specifically 
addressed missile defense as follows: 
We must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before 
they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the 
United States and our allies and friends. Our response must take full 
advantage of strengthened alliances, the establishment of new partnerships 
with former adversaries, innovation in the use of military forces, modern 
technologies, including the development of an effective missile defense 
system, and increased emphasis on intelligence collection and analysis.94 
The 2008 Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community continued the U.S. 
practice of viewing WMD and ballistic missiles as closely related capabilities.  J. Michael 
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Services Committee, said, “I note…that two activities [in Iran] relevant to a nuclear 
weapons capability continue: uranium enrichment that will enable the production of 
fissile material and development of long-range ballistic missile systems.”95 
 The only two states that the 2008 Threat Assessment of the Intelligence 
Community mentioned as posing a ballistic missile threat to the United States, owing to 
their pursuit of ICBM and WMD technology, are Iran and North Korea.  The 2008 Threat 
Assessment of the Intelligence Community concluded that Iran is seeking to enhance its 
ability to project military power through the development of missiles capable of striking 
Europe and North America with WMD.96  While the assessment noted that Tehran has 
halted its nuclear weapons program, the authors stated that “We assess with moderate-to-
high confidence that Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop nuclear 
weapons…And, as noted, Iran continues to deploy ballistic missiles inherently capable of 
delivering nuclear weapons, and to develop longer-range missiles.”97  
 Senator Jon Kyl expressed the American fear of long range Iranian missiles as a 
vehicle for WMD as follows: 
The latest IAEA report confirms that the Iranian missile threat is real and 
growing. Of course, as you know, there's very little reason to create a long 
range missile to carry a conventional warhead. General Obering was 
recently in Europe reminding the Europeans that within two to three years, 
Iranian missiles will be able to reach their capitals.98 
 The 2008 Threat Assessment described North Korea as a threat because of its 
desire to develop missiles and WMD in addition to its existing capabilities.  North Korea 
continues to pose a large threat because of its missile and WMD proliferation activities.  
“We remain concerned North Korea could proliferate nuclear weapons abroad.”99  
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Moreover, despite the failed 2006 test, the Taepo Dong-2 “probably has the potential 
capability to deliver a nuclear-weapon-sized payload to the continental United States. But 
we assess the likelihood of successful delivery would be low absent successful 
testing.”100    
The 2008 Threat Assessment assesses North Korean intentions as follows: 
Pyongyang probably views its capabilities as being more for deterrence 
and coercive diplomacy than for warfighting and would consider using 
nuclear weapons only under certain narrow circumstances. We also assess 
that Pyongyang probably would not attempt to use nuclear weapons 
against US forces or territory unless it perceived the regime to be on the 
verge of military defeat and risked an irretrievable loss of control.101 
2. European Assessment  
The European approach to assessing the ballistic missile threat appears to be 
based less on judgments regarding capabilities than the U.S. approach.  Europeans may 
not feel directly threatened by any state and may judge that any missile threat would be a 
result of developments outside their “security complex.”102  In the absence of a current 
threat, why would Europeans pursue a policy that could “rock the boat”?  Some Allies are 
concerned that, in deploying BMD, “the United States would worsen the security 
dilemma for its friends and foes without significantly improving security at home.”103 
Many Europeans share the American view that the proliferation of WMD and the 
spread of ballistic missile technology are linked.  However, from the perspective of 
European strategic culture, Europeans are more focused on the states intentions than on 
their proliferation efforts because capabilities do not equal intentions.  
Alexander Bitter, arguing from a German perspective, contends that the proposed 
BMD system should not be justified by threat assessments, but by its capability to deter 
the proliferation of missiles and WMD.   
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[C]redible political pressure can only be exerted if it is backed up by 
military capabilities which deter a potential adversary…If the Federal 
Republic wishes to retain its freedom of action in foreign policy and not to 
become vulnerable to political blackmail even without the express threat 
of intervention, it must convincingly demonstrate to a potential adversary 
that its military intentions would fail.  This is just the function of a shield 
for missile defence.104  
David C. Gompert (an American expert) and Klaus Arnhold (a German expert) 
echo Bitter’s view that too much emphasis has been placed on the threat “and not enough 
has been made of the structural-strategic logic.”105  Missiles and WMD have proliferated 
into today’s greatest security threat, and they continue to proliferate despite arms control 
regimes.  According to Gompert and Arnhold, BMD is necessary because it will reduce 
the likelihood of nuclear weapons being used and decrease the payoff of acquiring 
missiles and WMD.106  
 Sascha Lange and Oliver Thränert acknowledge that ballistic missiles are not 
themselves WMD but delivery systems for WMD.  They argue that this is a key 
distinction because the nature of the BMD debate changes drastically when a state does 
not possess WMD technology.107  Therefore, the debate is actually over the best way to 
respond to the proliferation of WMD, and a BMD system is one method of nullifying a 
state’s WMD arsenal if the WMD are intended for ballistic missile delivery.   
 According to Alexander Bitter, a German analyst, “From the European viewpoint, 
current threat assessments focus on two states: Iran and Pakistan.”108  Iran is considered 
a threat because it possesses TBMs that can threaten Europe, is developing nuclear 
weapons, and clearly desires to advance both programs.109  Lange and Thränert hold that 
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Washington’s projection that Iran will possess ICBMs by 2015 is excessive as it does not 
take into account the technical difficulties of developing such longer range missiles.110  
Additionally, in early 2007 the EU imposed sanctions on Iran which prohibited:  
[T]he direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to Iran of items, materials, 
equipment, goods and technology which could contribute to Iran's 
enrichment-related, reprocessing or heavy water-related activities, or to 
the development of  nuclear weapon delivery systems.111 
According to Bitter, Most Iranian missile technology is imported and antiquated, and the 
2007 sanctions will certainly slow development.112 
 Moreover, Bitter holds that Pakistan poses a threat to European security for 
several reasons.113  First, Pakistan has been a nuclear weapons state since 1999 and 
possesses over 40 nuclear warheads while continuing to build nuclear facilities.  Second, 
Pakistan has achieved a high level of sophistication with its ballistic missile program.  
While the longest range Pakistani missile has a range of only 2,500km (and Islamabad 
would need a 5,000 km range to reach Europe), the technology of Pakistani missiles is 
superior to that of Iranian missiles.  Longer ranges could therefore easily be achieved.  
Third, Pakistan receives technology assistance from China, which also views India as a 
potential security threat.  Finally, internal political instability and regional isolation make 
Pakistan unpredictable and a potential danger to Europe. 
Currently, North Korea does not pose a threat to Europe because its primary 
security focus is on Japan and the United States.114  Europe could become entangled in a 
North Korean- American conflict, but the direct threat to Europe is low.  Moreover, it 
appears that North Korea is becoming more receptive to negotiations as its economic 
situation continues to decline, reducing its threat level.  According to the International 
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Institute for Strategic Studies in London, North Korea’s missile program is more for 
“bargaining leverage and trading for political and economic benefits than for military 
use.”115 
When contrasted with the TMD threat, the BMD threat takes a different tone; and 
this is the primary reason for the divergence between European and American threat 
assessments.  Theater missiles (SRBMs, MRBMS, and IRBMs) are widely viewed as 
conventional weapons that do not pose a strategic threat, while ICBMs and WMD are 
viewed as virtually one and the same, and capable of posing a significant strategic threat.  
As noted in Chapter II, this view is erroneous because numerous SRBMs, MRBMs, and 
IRBMs have the range and the capability to deliver WMD to European Alliance 
members.  Halting the proliferation of SRBMs, MRBMs, and IRBMs is therefore as 
crucial as halting the proliferation of longer range missiles.  “Thus, the disagreement on 
the threat is primarily one of timing.  Whereas the United States believes that the threat to 
Europe and North America will become operational sooner rather than later, many 
Europeans believe the inverse.”116 
Experts on both sides of the Atlantic share the view that long range missiles are a 
primary delivery method for WMD and that to stop one is to limit the effectiveness of the 
other.  The United States regards BMD as a key method to counter WMD.  From the 
American perspective, building a BMD system would defeat a primary delivery method for 
WMD and thus reduce the benefits of acquiring both ICBMs and WMD.  Europeans appear 
to be more concerned with slowing WMD proliferation than acquiring BMD because they 
believe that the missile threat is not as immediate as the WMD threat.  From a European 





115 “North Korea's Weapons Programmes: A Net Assessment,” The International Institute for 
Strategic Studies.  http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers/north-korean-dossier/north-koreas-
weapons-programmes-a-net-asses/north-koreas-ballistic-missile-programme/.   
116 James Ferguson, “The Coupling Paradox: Nuclear Weapons, Ballistic Missile Defense, and the 
Future of the Transatlantic Relationship,” in NATO and European Security:  Alliance Poltics from the End 
of the Cold War to the Age of Terrorism, ed. Alexander Moens, Lenard J. Cohen, and Allen G. Sens 
(Westport, CT: Praeger 2003), 159. 
 44
                                                
proliferation; and BMD capabilities would decrease the benefits of acquiring missile 
technology should these regimes fail.  As a result, Europeans prefer to focus their efforts on 
strengthening control regimes that the United States considers important but imperfect and 
subject to failure.117 
As previously mentioned, the NATO European Allies do not feel directly 
threatened by all the states that the United States considers a threat, and European 
governments generally prefer to deal with threats in a manner different from that favored 
by the United States.  Since the late 1990s, for example, the United States and European 
governments have often diverged in their approach to dealing with Iran.  The United 
States has preferred to use sticks, while its European counterparts have favored carrots.  
Europe has a high degree of economic interaction with Iran.  “The EU is the first trade 
partner of Iran, accounting for almost a third of its exports.”118  European observers hold 
that trade provides Europe with greater access to negotiations with Tehran and decreased 
vulnerability, as Iran has grown increasingly dependent on European trade. 
Finally, strategic culture exerts a large influence in how both sides of the Atlantic 
perceive potential threats.  The United States, fearful of being threatened, views 
Pyongyang and Tehran’s activities as hostile.  From the American perspective, why 
would Iran and North Korea develop ICBMs and WMD if they did not intend to use 
them?  European strategic culture leads most European governments to focus on the 
intentions of Pyongyang and Tehran.  Just because Iran and North Korea develop ICBMs 
and WMD does not mean that they will use them.  From the European perspective, 
insecurity and vulnerability lead states to seek protective measures and the proposed U.S. 
BMD may increase these feelings. 
B. TECHNICAL UNCERTAINTIES 
 There are numerous technical uncertainties associated with the proposed U.S. 
BMD system because it is relatively new.  Despite the level of technical uncertainty 
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associated with the BMD system, NATO and the United States agree that it is technically 
feasible to construct such a system.  As stated in the introduction, the Missile Defence 
Feasibility Study (MD-FS), which was initiated at the 2002 Prague Summit, concluded, 
as the Allies noted at the 2006 Riga Summit, that “missile defence is technically feasible 
within the limitations and assumptions of the study.”119  Most recently, at the April 2008 
Bucharest Summit the Allies declared that “we therefore recognise the substantial 
contribution to the protection of Allies from long-range ballistic missiles to be provided 
by the planned deployment of European-based United States missile defence assets.”120 
 While the NATO Allies have agreed that developing a BMD system is technically 
feasible, it appears that the debate about the technical uncertainties has shifted to the 
timeline involved in developing the technology and closing the “gaps” in protection.  The 
United States has proposed to deploy the BMD system in Europe by 2011 despite the fact 
that its reliability has not been demonstrated.  The Government Accountability Office 
concluded in February 2008 that: 
We were unable to assess whether MDA met its overall performance goal 
because there have not been enough flight tests to provide a high 
confidence that the models and simulations accurately predict BMDS 
performance. Moreover, the tests done to date have been developmental in 
nature, and do not provide sufficient realism for DOD’s test and 
evaluation Director to determine whether BMDS is suitable and effective 
for battle.121   
The BMD system that is currently deployed in Alaska and California cannot be 
considered fully operational.  Since 1999, tests of the United States BMD system have 
produced mixed results with only seven out of 12 tests resulting in a successful 
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engagement.122  The United States plans to install a two stage version of the interceptor 
in Europe instead of the three stage interceptor that is being used in tests and that is 
currently deployed in Alaska and California.123  According to some observers, the two 
stage version may be subject to additional uncertainties.  However, Lieutenant General 
Henry Obering, the Director of the Missile Defense Agency, said in November 2008 that 
the two stage missiles are a “low-risk” version of the three-stage interceptors, with 
similar software and sensors.124  
Concern over the ability of the BMD system to perform as intended has led 
Congress to reduce funding for any European sites and to “set stringent conditions on 
future work.”125  Several years of additional testing could yield a system that is 
considered fully reliable, and this would be significant for quieting skeptics on both sides 
of the Atlantic. 
 The potential “gaps” in protection for portions of southern Europe constitute an 
additional technical concern.  Speaking on Alliance solidarity and the proposed BMD 
system, NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer commented that, “In our 
Alliance, security is indivisible.  And that is why, when it comes to missile defence, there 
simply cannot be an ‘A-league’ and a ‘B-league’ within NATO.”126  The Allies stated in 
the Bucharest Summit Declaration that: 
Bearing in mind the principle of the indivisibility of Allied security as well 
as NATO solidarity, we task the Council in Permanent Session to develop 
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coverage to all Allied territory and populations not otherwise covered by 
the United States system for review at our 2009 Summit, to inform any 
future political decision.127 
Some European observers contend that even if the southern European “gaps” were filled 
with TMD systems, this would not provide the same level of protection as that proposed 
for the rest of NATO Europe. 
 In comparison to TMD systems, the proposed BMD system is still several years 
away from becoming technically reliable.  This is not to say that the technology does not 
exist, but that it has not been fully developed yet.  As Alexander Bitter, a German expert, 
has written, “Since 2002 enormous progress has occurred in the USA in this field..the 
number of military experts and scientists who believe that the US plans are technically 
feasible is multiplying.”128   
In contrast with the BMD system, TMD systems have been employed 
successfully in combat, and new systems that have undergone extensive testing will be 
fielded within the next year.  In comparison to the BMD test results, since 2002 there 
have been 22 upper tier TMD tests (17 Aegis and 5 THAAD) and 20 of them have 
resulted in successful engagements.129  The BMD system is being deployed before the 
technology has been as fully proven as with TMD.   
C. DECISION-MAKING FRAMEWORK OF BMD 
As discussed in Chapter II, the decision-making framework regarding the 
procurement of TMD systems is relatively straightforward, in that the Allies that wish to 
procure TMD systems do so.  Only the Alliance members that wish to bear the costs and 
benefits of TMD systems do so.  This system of national level procurement also extends 
to BMD.  “From NATO’s point of view it is no doubt regrettable that a major element of 
the defence of the European continent requiring the cooperation of three NATO allies is 
not more fully integrated into the Alliance – but that is by no means unusual.”130  
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However, to a greater degree than with TMD systems, the proposed BMD system will 
affect the Alliance as a whole, and all members will share in its benefits as well as its 
political costs and security risks, whatever their contribution level.  It is for this reason 
that the decision making framework for BMD has become a contentious issue. 
Most European governments express varying levels of support for the proposed 
BMD system.  While some governments express concerns about the proposed U.S. BMD 
system, most acknowledge its potential benefits.  Confirming this view is Paragraph 37 of 
the Bucharest Summit Declaration, where the Allies agreed to “recognise the substantial 
contribution to the protection of Allies from long-range ballistic missiles to be provided 
by the planned deployment of European-based United States missile defence assets.”131  
The primary opposition to the proposed U.S. BMD system has come in the form of public 
opinion.  
Prague and Warsaw have already agreed to host portions of the proposed U.S. 
BMD system.  Polish government support for the proposed U.S. BMD system is strong as 
Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s Civic Platform party controls a majority of Senate seats 
and a near majority in the Sejm.  While government support for the proposed U.S. BMD 
system is strong, public support is much lower.  According to Polish Defense Minister 
Bogdan Klich, "About 15 percent of Poles would support the American installation of the 
shield in Poland, without any other contributions…But 50 percent would support such an 
installation if it contributed to the modernization of our armed forces."132   
Support in the Czech Republic is much weaker because of the fragile coalition 
government assembled by Prime Minister Mirek Topolánek.  While the Topolánek 
coalition supports the proposed U.S. BMD system now, low public support may force 
dissention with in the coalition.  In the Czech Republic, public opinion polls indicate that 
only about 35% of Czechs support basing elements of the proposed U.S. BMD system on 
Czech soil. 133   
 
131 “Bucharest Summit Declaration.”   
132 Bogdan Klich quoted by Judy Dempsey, “Poland Wants U.S. to be Third Leg of its Security Plan,” 
International Herald Tribune (April 21, 2008). http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/04/21/europe/poland.php.  
133 Andrew Thompson, “Czech Republic: Issues Under the Radar,” International Relations and 
Security Network (June 23, 2008).  http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Security-
Watch/Detail/?ots591=4888CAA0-B3DB-1461-98B9-E20E7B9C13D4&lng=en&id=57315.    
 49
                                                
1. The U.S. Approach (Bilateralism) 
The United States has a history of bilateral negotiations concerning BMD within 
the Alliance.  The United States has long had agreements with the United Kingdom and 
Denmark (Greenland), where portions of its BMD system are located.  Recently, the 
United States concluded several years of talks with formal agreements with the Czech 
Republic and Poland over the installation of the proposed BMD system.  These 
agreements continue the pattern of Washington conducting bilateral BMD diplomacy 
outside the North Atlantic Council.  However, since early 2007 the bilateral negotiations 
have received greater attention within the Alliance.   
 The primary reason why the United States sought bilateral agreements on the 
current BMD issues is that Washington did not want to subject its plans to decisions of 
the North Atlantic Council, and has been concerned about relinquishing command and 
control to NATO.  The Bush Administration has viewed the BMD issue as crucial to 
national security.  Therefore, Washington does not want its BMD plans to be subject to 
the consensus of the 26 member Alliance, where one member could veto a matter of U.S. 
national security.134  While some officials in Washington may fear the loss of U.S. 
authority over command and control, historically this has rarely been the case.135 
Martin Butcher and Nicola Butler maintain that the U.S. administration made a 
diplomatic blunder in attempting to broker bilateral deals with certain Allies instead of 
making BMD decisions subject to consensus in the North Atlantic Council.136  Speaking 
on American bilateral diplomacy, U.S. Representative Ellen Tauscher stated, “I have 
been concerned that the administration initially sought to bypass NATO on this issue and 
move forward on a bilateral basis with Poland and the Czech Republic.  I thought this 
was a mistake and publicly voiced my concerns…sometimes it’s faster to work with a 
‘coalition of the willing,’ but such coalitions usually don’t have strong foundations.”137  
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2. The European Approach (Through NATO/Multilateralism) 
While NATO has traditionally relied on national efforts to develop and deploy 
BMD systems, the current debate has taken a tone different from that in previous BMD 
discussions, at least from the European perspective.  While it is acknowledged that 
missile and WMD control regimes are not 100% effective, they are a less divisive means 
of dealing with the proliferation of such weapons than the pursuit of BMD.   
According to Butler and Butcher, the American BMD system is “damaging European 
cohesion and security, bringing NATO-Russia relations to their lowest point since the 
end of the Cold War.”138  Ambivalent European reactions to the proposed U.S. BMD 
system may stem in part from a fear that the  United States is creating a security problem 
for Europe, because the European Allies did not request a BMD system,  and the United 
States has been cautious about subjecting the decision making process to the North 
Atlantic Council.  
 In addition to the impact a BMD system might have on the Alliance as a whole, 
many of the factors that influence the decision making process for TMD systems may 
also influence the BMD decision making process.  First, there is the issue of multilateral 
weapons development.  As with TMD, the United States has a distinct set of priorities in 
developing a BMD system and the design of the system reflects those priorities.  The 
United States prefers to develop BMD technology alone rather than via a joint 
development with Alliance members that have expressed interest.  Additionally, some 
European members of the Alliance are showing interest in the creation of a European-
developed BMD system.  French President Nicolas Sarkozy, in a speech delivered on 17 
June 2008, noted that “Europe and France are today more exposed. The task of 
‘protecting’ the people and territory must thus be given priority…This is why we must 
develop advanced ballistic missile launch detection systems.”139  It should be noted that 
President Sarkozy’s “defense” would consist of threatening to retaliate against the 
attacker, not intercepting the attacking missile. 
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Second, there is a large technology gap between the United States and the rest of 
the Allies which inhibits joint development of BMD.  The technological advantage of the 
United States has influenced its strategic culture,140 and the long-standing pattern has 
been for the United States to develop advanced military technologies on its own or with 
few foreign partners.   
 Finally, domestic economic interests play a large role in the BMD decision 
making process.  As with TMD systems, the American defense companies that rely on 
the development and sale of missile defense technology wish to see their monopoly on 
such contracts continue.  A multinational BMD project would mean diminished national 
profits as well as greater technology sharing – two prospects unlikely to appeal to most 
American companies.  Addressing this issue, the 2008 French White Paper on Defence 
and National Security states: 
France must retain its areas of [technical] sovereignty, concentrated on the 
capability necessary for the maintenance of the strategic and political 
autonomy of the nation: nuclear deterrence; ballistic missiles; SSNs; and 
cyber-security are amongst the priorities. As regards the other 
technologies and capacities that it may wish to acquire, France believes 
that the European framework must be privileged.141 
The United States will probably continue to pursue bilateral arrangements for the 
deployment of its BMD system in Europe if it feels that working within the Alliance will 
not achieve satisfactory results.  According to Bitter, “If the United States receive no 
positive signal from NATO, they will continue their programme bilaterally as they have 
done so far.  The beginning of negotiations with Warsaw and Prague has led to 
considerable tensions in the North Atlantic Council.”142  If NATO does not become more 
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defense architecture which the Americans are largely paying for; and a “central aspect of 
the transatlantic security architecture would be dealt with outside the alliance instead of 
inside it.”143 
D. COSTS AND THE EFFECTS THAT BMD MIGHT HAVE ON THE 
SECURITY STATUS QUO 
One of the largest European concerns over the proposed BMD system is the 
unknown effects it will have on the existing security status quo.  According to Colin 
Gray, European fears about the U.S. BMD system revolve around three potential effects 
that the BMD system could have on the international system and nonproliferation 
regimes.144  First, the American pursuit of a BMD system could diminish confidence in 
the existing forms of deterrence.  Second, Europeans are concerned that a BMD system 
could reduce confidence in existing security systems, hurt current nonproliferation 
efforts, and result in less attention to “the broad gauged policy effort that is required to 
bolster and advance the global non-proliferation regime.”145  Finally, Europeans have 
expressed concern that a BMD system could undermine strategic stability by leading to 
an arms race.  
The traditional view of deterrence relies heavily on the threat of retaliation to 
deter potential adversaries.  During the Cold War, the Alliance relied heavily on U.S. 
nuclear forces for deterrence.  The European fear is that the United States has embarked 
on its BMD system because of its reduced confidence in deterrence based on threats of 
nuclear retaliation.146  However, European anxieties about the change in Washington’s 
views on deterrence may be misplaced. 
 First, the Cold War era style of deterrence is not suited to today’s strategic 
environment, which is characterized by diverse regional threats instead of a bipolar 
hegemonic system.147  U.S. deterrence policies since the end of the Cold War have 
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placed greater emphasis on deterrence by denial in order to meet today’s threats.  The 
BMD system would deter potential adversaries from acquiring missile technology by 
rendering it ineffective.  Additionally, should an adversary still acquire long range 
missiles, a BMD system could provide a certain level of defence.  Second, the proposed 
BMD system would actually decrease the threat of an outbreak of nuclear conflict by 
providing the Alliance with a form of deterrence that is based on active defense 
(deterrence by denial) instead of retaliation.148 
The view that the BMD system could undermine the existing security system and 
hurt nonproliferation efforts is rooted in a bipolar conception of the international system 
that is reminiscent of the era when the world was divided between NATO and the 
Warsaw Pact.  Again, regional conflicts and regional powers have replaced the bipolar 
international system.  Each state has to be dealt with on a case by case basis with much 
less predictable results.  The current mainstream European position might be 
characterized as based 20 years in the past while the U.S. position looks 20 years into the 
future.  Friction occurs between the two as many Europeans do not see a missile threat 
emerging until well after 2015 while many Americans believe that the threat will develop 
sooner rather than later.   
Strategic culture also influences the different views on the potential impacts of a 
BMD system on the security system and nonproliferation efforts.  According to Joanna 
Spear, an expert at George Washington University, “European activism on proliferation 
issues (such as it is) is directed toward improving the performance of the various arms 
control regimes rather than finding substitutes for them.”149  Many Europeans would 
prefer to maintain the status quo by way of small adjustments and arms control and 
nonproliferation regimes.  
Europeans tend to place even greater emphasis than Americans on non-
proliferation regimes as an essential part of controlling the spread of missile and WMD 
technology.  Joanna Spear has underlined the lack of European cohesiveness:  
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Just as there are divisions between the United States and Europe, there is no united 
Europe on proliferation issues.  The states of the European Union (EU) have different 
geostrategic outlooks and preoccupations.  Although there are some common concerns, 
perceptions of the severity of the various proliferation threats differ.  The most extreme 
cleavage is between neutral states and nuclear states.150 
As previously mentioned, Europeans generally do not feel as vulnerable as 
Americans to “rogue state” proliferation threats.  As a result, they believe that these 
“rogue states” can be dealt with through diplomacy or political or economic pressure.151  
“Fundamentally, for Europeans the crux of the proliferation issue is the health of the 
various nonproliferation regimes…European efforts primarily go into reducing threats by 
making the multilateral regimes function more effectively, rejecting the apparent U.S. 
assumption that such regimes are beyond repair.”152 
The widespread European fear is that the U.S. BMD system could undermine 
international security by destabilizing a system of arms control that had been working 
“well enough.”  The Russian opposition to the proposed BMD system “has been playing 
on European concerns about strategic stability, the future of arms control, and arms 
racing.”153 
According to Colin Gray, “Europeans are fearful that America’s foes, unable or 
unwilling to compete directly (offensively or defensively) with a homeland BMD 
deployment, will instead disseminate missile technology, and perhaps complete systems, 
to potential ‘rogues.’”154  This view may have merit.  As Dennis Gormley has noted, the 
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efforts.155  “Knowing that defences are not nearly as effective against LACMs as they are 
against ballistic missiles, some states, including China, Pakistan and Iran, are now 
developing LACMs to complement their ballistic-missile arsenals.”156 
As noted in Chapter II, because of the spread of WMD and missile technology, 
TMD systems already have the potential to affect the security status quo in significant 
ways.  Both TMD and BMD will have numerous effects on the international security 
system and nonproliferation regimes.  However, it is likely that the effects of U.S. BMD 
and U.S. and NATO TMD will be positive as they will provide the Alliance with another 
form of deterrence and additional flexibility when conducting diplomacy.  A new type of 
deterrence is needed to deal with smaller regional actors and states that are considered to 
be “rogues” as the threat of nuclear retaliation may not be sufficient to deter regional 
aggression.  A BMD system would strengthen existing arms control and nonproliferation 
regimes by decreasing the benefits of acquiring missile technology and increasing the 
incentives to participate in such regimes.  Finally, the potential for a BMD system to spur 
a new arms race may come to fruition through the proliferation of LACMs.  While 
modern U.S. TMD systems offer a level of increased protection against LACMs, this is 
not sufficient to stop the proliferation of LACM technology.  The proliferation in LACM 
technology can be partially attributed to the weak state of control regimes for LACMs.  
As Dennis Gormley has observed, 
Faulty non-proliferation policies need urgent attention. The second-class 
treatment of cruise missiles will not change until the Hague Code gives the 
same normative status to ballistic and cruise missiles. A more progressive 
approach to addressing missile proliferation within the Missile 
Technology Control Regime is also required to curb the LACM 
epidemic.157 
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E. DIALOGUE AND COOPERATION WITH RUSSIA AS IT PERTAINS TO 
BMD 
 The most vocal opposition from outside the Alliance to the proposed BMD 
system has come from Russia.  The Russian reaction to the proposed BMD system can 
best be described as schizophrenic.  Moscow’s primary objection to the proposed U.S. 
BMD system is that it will pose a threat to Russia.  Secretary of Defense Robert Gates 
argues that the proposed U.S. BMD system would not be able to defeat any missile 
originating from Russia.  Gates has added that “the geometry that is involved makes it 
impossible for these…missile defense interceptors to be used against Russian missiles to 
start with…[T]he notion that the Russian arsenal is any way put in jeopardy, by 10 
interceptors, I think, is laughable.”158 
 The United States has made continued efforts to address Russian fears of the 
proposed European elements of the U.S. BMD system.  The first step for the installation 
of the BMD system in Europe was the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.  In 2002 
this withdrawal took effect without arousing much Russian opposition.  In fact, at the 
time some analysts even believed that Russia welcomed the U.S. plans to build the BMD 
system as it would provide a chance for cooperation and the creation of new military and 
business links to NATO.159   
 Since 2002, Russian opposition to the U.S. plan has steadily increased, and it 
appears to have intensified since early 2007.  In an attempt to derail U.S.-Polish 
negotiations, Russian officials announced that they would place a large number of 
medium range missiles in Belarus and Kaliningrad to counter the U.S. missile sites in 
Poland.160  Henryk Szlajfer, a Polish expert, assesses Russian motives and goals as 
follows:  
 
158 Robert Gates, “Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence in the 21st Century,” (speech given at the 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington D.C., October 28, 2008), 
http://carnegieendowment.org/events/index.cfm?fa=eventDetail&id=1202&&prog=zgp.  
159 Andrei Shoumikhin,  “Evolving Russian Perspectives on Missile Defense: The Emerging 
Accommodation,”  Comparative Strategy  21 (2002): 332. 
160 Radoslav Sikorski, Interviewed by Izabela Leszczyńska.  Dziennik. May 3, 2007, Translation by 
Polish News Bulletin of the British and American Embassies.   
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The Russians, for example, seem to understand the quintessence of Missile 
Defence correctly, and consider the American plans with calm. 
Notwithstanding occasional expressions of “concern,” which fluctuates 
depending on the general situation in Polish-Russian relations, this 
concerns the possible deployment of the system elements on the territory 
of Poland just as well. Incidentally, we know precious little about their 
own missile development plans. We know more about their TMD systems. 
What we do know, however, is that the US’s withdrawal from the ABM 
treaty, which obstructed the development of new active anti-missile 
defence technologies, generated but a feeble protest on their part. Also, it 
is by no means insignificant that the US authorities quite regularly inform 
Russia about their plans to develop and deploy missile defence.  The 
occasional “rumblings” coming from the Kremlin are thus given with 
other goals in mind. Hence, the opinions sometimes encountered in 
Poland, which link the missile defence issue with the repelling of a 
possible threat from Russia, are not well-founded.161 
 Former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations John Bolton contends that 
“Russia's threats against Poland are aimed at intimidating Western Europe.”162  By 
playing on European concerns about strategic stability and arms control, Russia has been 
able to place a wedge in the Alliance over the missile defense issue.163  According to 
Walter Slocombe, “The view in Washington, and in Central Europe, is that Russia cannot 
be permitted to assert a right to veto security cooperation between the United States and 
sovereign countries, especially when the cooperation poses no threat to Russian 
security.”164   
 While NATO has already engaged in cooperation with Russia in TMD efforts, 
cooperation with Russia in BMD efforts would present another set of challenges to 
overcome.  One of the largest obstacles to Russian cooperation with regard to BMD is 
that locations in Russia are not suitable for the U.S. BMD system, which is designed to 




161 Henryk Szlajfer, “The USA and the European Family,” The Polish Quarterly of International 
Affairs 4 (2006):  23. 
162 John Bolton, “Russia Unromanticized,” The Washington Post, October 20, 2008, A15. 
163 Ferguson, 168. 
164 Slocombe, 21. 
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Additionally, the usual problems associated with joint projects would arise.  Restrictions 
on information and technology transfers, as well as interoperability issues, would present 
problems, for example. 
 In spite of the potential issues that could inhibit cooperation with Russia on BMD 
efforts, Secretary Gates has outlined American efforts as follows:  
[W]e have gone a long way toward providing the necessary assurances, to 
Russia, that this system is not aimed at them but is aimed at a very limited 
threat coming from Iran.  And we have made a number of proposals to 
them, to provide them that reassurance, including having their 
representatives at both sites, in the Czech Republic and in Poland…[W]e 
have offered transparency in a variety of ways…[T]he Russian military 
has shown some interest in this.  But I think for political reasons, the 
Russians have chosen to make an issue of it.165 
Many agree that the best way to assuage Russian fears and quiet Moscow’s 
opposition might be through the incorporation of Russia into BMD efforts.  The Russian 
motivation to participate in BMD efforts might be similar to Moscow’s desire to 
participate in TMD efforts.  “Russian aerospace, defense, and other firms have evinced a 
long-standing interest in such collaboration— and have persistently overestimated U.S. 
interest.”166  Despite the qualified American interest in giving Russia a significant role in 
U.S. BMD activities, incorporating Moscow into the BMD process might help to reduce 












166 Richard Weitz, “Russian-American Security Cooperation After St. Petersburg: Challenges and 
Opportunities,” Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College (April 2007): 13.    
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?PubID=775.  
167 Gormley, 149. 
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IV. CONCLUSION  
TMD of forward deployed troops is the type of missile defense associated with 
the least amount of discord within the Alliance.  TMD is an acceptable form of missile 
defense because the Allies agree on the threat, the technological capabilities exist to 
defeat the threat, the decision making framework for the procurement of TMD systems is 
well established, and TMD cooperation activities with Russia have not caused 
controversy.  However, as discussed in Chapter II, TMD systems do have the potential to 
disrupt the security status quo; and this is one of the major arguments against a BMD 
system.   
BMD for the protection of NATO territory, forces and population centers is an 
area in which the United States and NATO appear to be taking divergent paths.  As 
discussed in Chapter III, the United States and its NATO Allies disagree over the threat, 
the political and strategic necessity to counter long range ballistic missile threats via 
active defenses, and the decision making framework for the procurement of a BMD 
system.  Cooperation with Russia over the proposed BMD system – and, indeed, Russian 
opposition to U.S. BMD deployment plans in Europe – have become an issue dividing 
the Allies. 
A. SUMMARY 
Of the five factors examined that could explain the divergence in BMD policy, the 
decision making process regarding the procurement of BMD systems and cooperation 
with Russia are the primary reasons that explain the divergent positions on BMD.  The 
economic benefits of participation in a BMD system appear to be a large incentive in the 
decision making process regarding the procurement of a BMD system.  Russia continues 
to place a wedge in the Alliance over its objection to the proposed U.S. BMD system and 
European governments are very sensitive to these concerns.  The threat assessment, 
technical uncertainties, and possible effects that a BMD could have on the status quo are 
not sufficient to explain the transatlantic divide over BMD policy.  
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The threat assessment is the first step towards the creation of a missile defense 
system because the threat provides the impetus for action.  As it relates to TMD, there is 
a proven threat to the Alliance as SRBM, MRBM, and IRBM technology is widespread 
and has been used in combat on numerous occasions.  The threat has provided the 
justification for the development and acquisition of TMD systems.   
The threat assessment for BMD differs sharply from that for TMD as few 
countries have developed ICBM technology, and no ICBM has ever been launched in 
aggression.  Therefore, the disagreement within the Alliance over the BMD threat 
appears to have several different aspects.   
First, the disagreement is over timing; it is not a matter of whether an ICBM 
threat will emerge, but of when it will emerge.  From a European perspective, the 
emergence of an ICBM threat is not as imminent as in U.S. assessments.  Moreover, 
many Europeans hold, when this threat emerges is when it will be time to consider 
whether to deploy a BMD system.  Even in the presence of Iranian ICBMs, some 
Europeans might well argue that state capabilities do not equal intentions.  From the 
perspective of the United States, waiting until an ICBM threat has emerged to deploy a 
BMD system would be imprudent as several potentially threatening states are continuing 
to develop ICBM technology, and their intentions may well be – or could rapidly become 
– hostile.   
Second, the divergent threat perception is partially influenced by differing 
judgments of the effect that a BMD system could have on Alliance efforts concerning 
arms control and nonproliferation regimes.  Would a BMD system help or hinder WMD 
nonproliferation efforts?  Governments on both sides of the Atlantic agree that WMD 
proliferation is a serious threat, that there is a correlation between WMD proliferation and 
ballistic missile proliferation, and that to limit one is to reduce the effectiveness of the 
other.  From a European perspective, a BMD system could have unintended negative 
effects on WMD nonproliferation efforts – for example, encouraging adversaries to seek 
non-ballistic means of attack, such as terrorist agents.  From the perspective of the United 
States, a BMD system would enhance existing arms control and nonproliferation regimes 
by increasing the incentive for regional states to participate in such regimes and 
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discouraging the acquisition of ballistic missiles.  Additionally, a BMD system could add 
a layer of security should these regimes fail.  Finally, the United States and its European 
Allies view different states as potential threats.  While all NATO Allies agree that Iran 
will possess long range missile technology in the future, North Korea is not viewed as a 
potential threat in the near to medium term by European governments and Pakistan is not 
viewed as a potential threat by the United States. 
Despite the disagreement over certain aspects of threat assessment, the view on 
both sides of the Atlantic is that the threat will exist at some time in the future and that a 
BMD system should be strongly considered to defend against this threat.  Many European 
observers acknowledge that Iran will possess MRBMs capable of striking most of Europe 
in the not to distant future and that this threat that cannot be ignored.  It is for these 
reasons that the differing threat assessments cannot explain the divergence in BMD 
policy.  
TMD systems present fewer technical uncertainties than the proposed U.S. BMD 
system for several reasons.  First, TMD technology has been continuously developed 
over the past 50 years.  While BMD test and development activities also have a long 
history, the first test of the U.S. BMD system proposed for deployment in Europe 
occurred in 1999.168  Second, it is technically easier to design a TMD system than a 
BMD system because of numerous factors, such as reduced radar detection range, 
reduced protection footprint, and less complicated interceptors.  Third, the development 
of TMD was necessary to protect forward deployed troops from a demonstrated threat.  
Alliance members had no choice but to develop TMD after the 1990-1991 Iraq War, in 
which TMD was ineffective against Iraqi ballistic missiles that caused numerous 
coalition casualties.  Finally, because relatively few technical uncertainties are associated 
with TMD, cost considerations are less significant than with BMD; and this encourages 
multilateral efforts such as SAMP/T and MEADS.   
 
 
168 “Ballistic Missile Defense Flight Record,” Missile Defense Agency. 
http://www.mda.mil/mdalink/pdf/testrecord.pdf. 
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In a situation that is comparable to that with the divergent BMD threat 
assessments, the technical uncertainties associated with BMD can be primarily attributed 
to time factors.  As noted in Chapter III, the Missile Defence Feasibility Study (MD-FS), 
which was initiated at the 2002 Prague Summit, concluded, as the Allies noted at the 
2006 Riga Summit, that “missile defence is technically feasible within the limitations and 
assumptions of the study.”169  While NATO member governments on both sides of the 
Atlantic believe that BMD is technically feasible in the future, there are reservations 
about the proposed BMD system capabilities available today.  Europeans are skeptical 
about the deployment of a system that, in their view, cannot today be considered fully 
reliable; and Congress has restricted funding for deployment until the system has 
achieved a higher level of demonstrated reliability.   
Moreover, the fact remains that the proposed U.S. BMD system would leave 
portions of southeastern NATO Europe unprotected, especially from threats originating 
from Middle Eastern states.  The deployment of a capable TMD architecture consisting of 
Aegis BMD, THAAD and Patriot linked together via NATO’s ALTBMD might not 
provide the same level of protection as that proposed for the rest of NATO Europe 
against long-range ballistic missile threats.  However, the NATO countries in 
southeastern Europe might be at greater risk from shorter-range missiles than from 
ICBMs. 
The technical uncertainties regarding the proposed U.S. BMD system are not 
sufficient to explain the divergence in BMD policy.  As previously noted, the MDFS 
concluded that missile defense is possible with current technology.  While portions of 
southeastern NATO Europe would not be protected by the proposed U.S. BMD system, 
this is actually a benefit to these Alliance members.  Proven TMD systems would have to 
be deployed to the region to protect those Alliance members.  Patriot, Aegis BMD, and 
THAAD are considered more reliable, better suited to engage shorter range threats (such 
as SRBMs, MRBMs, and IRBMs), and they both offer greater flexibility than the 
proposed BMD system.   
 
169 “Riga Summit Declaration,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization (November 29, 2006): Paragraph 
25.  http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-150e.htm.  
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The decision making frameworks regarding the procurement of TMD and BMD 
systems are similar in that in each case NATO relies on national efforts to provide the 
Alliance with missile defense assets.  As a result, the Alliance members that are willing 
to bear the financial costs to develop or purchase missile defense systems are the only 
ones to do so.170  Domestic economic pressures – including defense industries, 
technology firms, and labor unions – are strong factors in the decision to develop missile 
defense systems.  As the technical uncertainties decrease, the number of Alliance 
members pursuing national missile defense projects may increase.   
The key difference between the decision making process for TMD and that for 
BMD is that BMD has the potential to affect the Alliance as a whole, regardless of an 
individual Ally’s desires.  With TMD systems, only the Allies that wish to participate are 
affected in specific situations by operations involving TMD assets.  In contrast, a 
successful engagement by the proposed BMD system might produce debris that could fall 
on the soil of Alliance members that opposed the acquisition (or use) of the BMD system 
and that would nonetheless be affected by it.   
The Missile Defense Agency has addressed this concern by stating that three 
factors combine to virtually eliminate debris.  First, the kinetic kill interceptor impacts 
the ballistic missile with a closing velocity of over 7km per second and the “[r]esulting 
kinetic energy vaporizes much of the reentry vehicle, warhead, and kill vehicle.”171  
Second, engagements occur at an altitude of 200km, which means that the debris that is 
not destroyed by the intercept will most likely be burned up upon reentry into the earth’s 
atmosphere.  Finally, “flight tests have shown that very little debris reaches the earth – 
pieces average no more than 21 cm long.”172   
The decision making framework is one of the two reasons that could explain the 
divergent BMD policies.  As noted previously, European defense industries, technology 
firms, and labor unions are very interested in playing a greater role in the development of 
 
170 NATO’s ALTBMD project is an exception, in that it is a commonly funded endeavor, with a high 
level of participation by Allies.  ALTBMD will offer a means to link national TMD systems. 
171 “Proposed U.S. Missile Defense Assets in Europe,” Missile Defense Agency. 
http://www.mda.mil/mdalink/pdf/euroassets.pdf.   
172 Ibid. 
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military systems, especially missile defense systems.  The economic benefits of 
developing a missile defense system appear to exert a strong influence on the level of 
support a government shows for the proposed BMD system.  As previously noted, 
French, Polish, and Russian officials have commented on the willingness of their 
governments to support a BMD system if their countries had a greater economic stake in 
the project. 
The effects that TMD and BMD could have on the security status quo are 
comparable in some ways.  The proliferation of missile and WMD technology and the 
shift from an international system characterized by the bipolar stalemate of the Cold War 
era to one dominated by regional conflicts between regional powers mean that shorter 
range ballistic missiles now constitute strategic security threats for states within range of 
these missiles.  During the Cold War the United States and the Soviet Union were mainly 
concerned with each other’s ICBMs and SLBMs, and defenses against strategic ballistic 
missile threats were constrained by the 1972 ABM Treaty.  As noted in Chapter II, Iran 
can threaten several Alliance members with WMD-armed SRBMs and MRBMs.  The 
European fear that a BMD system could lead to an arms race, undermine existing forms 
of deterrence, or reduce confidence in existing arms control and nonproliferation regimes 
ignores the fact that TMD has not led to any of these problems while virtually nullifying 
the strategic arsenals of regional powers armed with SRBMs and MRBMs.  It is for this 
reason that the possible effects a BMD system may have on the security status quo are 
not sufficient to explain the divergent BMD policies. 
TMD and BMD cooperation as it pertains to Russia sees the Allies dealing with 
Russia in different capacities.  Through the NATO-Russia Council, NATO is the primary 
interlocutor when it comes to TMD cooperation with Russia; and Russia has regularly 
participated in NATO TMD exercises.  The United States is the primary interlocutor with 
Russia on BMD issues.  Russia continues to oppose the proposed deployment of the U.S. 
BMD system in Europe, and Russia’s objections have created problems within the 
Alliance despite Washington’s efforts to broker an acceptable deal with Moscow. 
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In addition to the decision making process regarding the procurement of a BMD 
system, Russian opposition to the proposed U.S. BMD system explains the divergence in 
BMD policy.  Geopolitics, geoeconomics, and proximity to Russia make Europeans more 
sensitive to Russian objections.  The view from Washington is that Moscow is 
intentionally attempting to place a wedge in the Alliance over the BMD issue.  While this 
may be the case, the fact remains that, from the European perspective, Moscow’s 
objections must be dealt with.      
B. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
As previously mentioned, three factors seem to form the foundation of the 
disagreement within the Alliance over the proposed U.S. BMD system.  Differences 
regarding threat assessments, the political and strategic necessity of BMD to counter 
long-range missile threats, and the decision making process involved in procuring a BMD 
system are posing significant obstacles for the Alliance.  In order for the Alliance to 
move forward regarding the proposed U.S. BMD system, a stronger consensus must be 
reached on at least two of the three major issues. 
 
1.  Washington should encourage dialogue with fewer preconditions with WMD and 
missile proliferants.   
 
The divergent threat assessments reflect disagreements over the speed at which 
regional powers are developing ICBM technology, the possible effects that a BMD 
system could have on arms control and nonproliferation regimes, and the threat posed by 
regional powers.  These differing perceptions will probably persist as they are difficult to 
reconcile and derive from differences in judgment about controversial issues.  However, 
NATO governments on both sides of the Atlantic agree that ballistic missiles are a 
primary delivery vehicle for WMD, and this agreement should be the basis for 
formulating a consensus on threat assessment.  The United States and its NATO Allies 
might play a greater role in promoting support for WMD nonproliferation and arms 
control regimes by agreeing to less stringent requirements for nuclear discussions with 
Pyongyang and Tehran.   
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In exchange for an increased American commitment to less restrictive dialogue 
with WMD and missile proliferants, the Alliance could reconfirm its support for the 
installation of the U.S. BMD system in Europe.   The BMD system could strengthen arms 
control and nonproliferation regimes.  The BMD system could increase the incentive for 
regional powers to negotiate by decreasing the payoff of acquiring missile technology.  
Moreover, the proposed BMD system could provide a level of protection should 
negotiations fail.   
2.  Washington should offer to deploy a TMD architecture to southeastern NATO 
Europe before the deployment of the proposed BMD system in Poland and the 
Czech Republic. 
 
The technical uncertainties of the proposed BMD system are straightforward in 
that, European observers hold, it has not yet demonstrated a high level of operational 
effectiveness and leaves portions of southeastern NATO Europe exposed.  As noted 
previously, there is a consensus within the Alliance that BMD is technically feasible and 
within U.S. capabilities to produce.  However, the proposed system is not yet regarded by 
European Allied observers as fully reliable, and it is not known if its reliability will have 
been fully demonstrated by the proposed 2011 deployment date.  This is one of the 
primary reservations expressed by European and American critics of the proposed BMD 
deployment in Europe.  Since the deployment of the system is a politically contentious 
issue and there are continuing disagreements on certain threat assessments, critics argue 
that the system’s technical reliability must be demonstrated before it can be deployed.  It 
would be much easier to persuade the Allies about the system’s merits in the absence of 
full consensus regarding a common threat if the system’s technical reliability had been 
convincingly demonstrated.  Washington projects that Iran will develop missiles capable 
of striking most of Europe by 2015, and this timeline allows the United States and its 
NATO Allies more time for BMD development.  Moreover, critics note, delaying BMD 
deployment would allow more time for arms control and nonproliferation regimes to 
operate.   
As noted in Chapter II, because of the proximity of southeastern European Allies 
to the Middle East, a BMD system would not be able to protect them from long-range 
missile threats.  Threats to these Allies originating from the Middle East would have to be 
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of a shorter range variety.  IRBMs and ICBMs could not be used.  This means that the 
ballistic missile threat posed to southeastern NATO Europe is only from MRBMs and 
SRBMs.  In order to protect this region, a missile defense architecture consisting of lower 
and upper TMD systems would have to be deployed.  Since the TMD systems are 
considered fully reliable and the TMD threat currently exists, the United States should 
propose that a TMD plan be established and implemented for the region before the 
deployment of the U.S. BMD system.  This would be a perfect opportunity for the 
implementation of NATO’s ALTBMD and could facilitate Allied cooperation at the 
TMD level, which might also promote cooperation at the BMD level.   
 
3. The BMD system would have an effect on the Alliance as a whole, and therefore 
Washington should encourage Allied participation in the development, testing, and 
fielding of the BMD system.   
 
The decision-making framework for BMD is different from that for TMD in that a 
BMD system has the potential to affect the Alliance as a whole, not just the states that 
participate in the system and in operations involving TMD.  This “group” effect 
combined with the rising pressures of domestic industries means that Washington should 
find ways to involve European governments and industries in BMD development and 
procurement.  It is difficult to win support for a politically unpopular plan when there is 
little domestic pressure on European governments to accept it. 
4.  Washington should emphasize the fact that TMD systems have not altered the 
security status quo while performing the strategic defense function envisaged for the 
proposed BMD system. 
 
From the perspective of some European observers, the possible undesirable 
effects that a BMD system could have on the security status quo – above all, in provoking 
negative Russian reactions – are excessive in relation to the probable benefits of 
deploying a BMD system.  Moreover, critics contend that the pursuit of BMD neglects 
the shift in the international system from the bipolar stalemate of the Cold War to today’s 




                                                
created a security dilemma for regional powers contemplating the pursuit of shorter-range 
ballistic missiles, because to some extent these strategic capabilities have already been 
nullified by TMD. 
5.  Washington should maintain its current offers to Moscow of transparency and 
cooperation while striving to enhance Alliance solidarity in the face of Russian 
opposition. 
 
The split cooperation with Russia, with NATO being the primary TMD 
interlocutor and the United States being the primary BMD interlocutor, is not achieving 
results that are satisfactory to Russia, the United States, or the European members of the 
Alliance.  U.S. and Allied efforts to include and negotiate with Russia over BMD issues 
have been exemplary.  However, Moscow continues to create tension within the Alliance 
through its opposition to the proposed U.S. BMD system.  Despite the fact that 
Washington, Prague, and Warsaw have agreed to allow Russian observers at the proposed 
U.S. BMD system locations under specified conditions, Moscow continues to press for 
more concessions.  It appears that Moscow is pushing for a joint project.  In April 2008, 
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov commented, "We are convinced that the best 
way to assuage Russia's concerns . . . will be to abandon such plans and turn to a truly 
collective project."173 
It is likely that the Russian opposition will not change, so the United States should 
take measures to change Allied perceptions of this opposition.  By increasing Alliance 
involvement and solidarity on the BMD system, the United States and its Allies can 
change how the Russian opposition is perceived by European public opinion.   
Finally, Russian objections may or may not be quelled.  Washington could take 
Moscow up on its offer to use the Azerbaijan radar site without incurring significant 
additional economic cost.  At the very least, an early warning radar could be established 
at this location or at another location acceptable to Moscow.  This might enable Moscow 
to feel that it is participating in collaboration and not being subjected to a unilateral deal. 
 
 
173 Sergei Lavrov quoted by Richard Weitz, “Russian Missile Defense Dispute,” World Politics 
Review (April 7, 2008). http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/article.aspx?id=1904.   
 69
The long-range ballistic missile threat will emerge at a date in the not too distant 
future.  The proposed U.S. BMD system is highly capable, but many European observers 
maintain that it has not yet been demonstrated to be fully reliable.  Since the threat is 
continuing to mature, the United States should sustain efforts to develop and improve its 
BMD system.  In the mean time, because southeastern Europe is already threatened, the 
United States should install a TMD system.  This would show the U.S. commitment to 
missile defense to the NATO European Allies and to regional powers pursuing long-
range ballistic missiles.   
The United States has to include the Alliance in key BMD decisions, as with the 
North Atlantic Council decisions at Prague (2002), Riga (2006), and Bucharest (2008).  
Because the project has implications for all the Allies, it must involve collective decision-
making.  An increased role for European governments and industries may change 
European perspectives.  Washington might be able to generate support from European 
governments through the incorporation of European industries in BMD endeavors.   
To address European fears that the BMD system might disrupt the security status 
quo, Washington should point out that TMD systems have not destabilized the security of 
the Allies while performing the same strategic function – protection of territory and 
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